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INTRODUCTION
Since the infamous visit by Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui) to the
United States in 1995, the issue of Taiwan has received much aca-
demic and political attention. More recently, Lee's separatist orien-
tation became so bold that he made an unprecedented remark to
German journalists on July 9, 1999. Specifically, he stated that the
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relations across the Taiwan Strait should be "State-to-State relations,
or at least special State-to-State relations...."' This irresponsible re-
mark again caused a new round of tensions between China's main-
land and Taiwan.
Lee's "two-states" theory reinvigorated debates over a variety of
issues. Some of these include: inter alia, what political status the re-
gime in Taiwan possesses; whether Taiwan already satisfies the cri-
teria for statehood and therefore independence; and whether Taiwan
has the right to self-determination, including the right to unilaterally
secede from China as a whole. This essay discusses these three broad
issues from the point of view of international law. Section I discusses
the attributes of Taiwan as Chinese territory and the nature of the
Taiwan issue by examining the history of Chinese settlement and
administration, the invalidity of the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki
ceding Taiwan to Japan, the legal effects of relevant international le-
gal instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945
Potsdam Proclamation, the effects of the PRC Government's succes-
sion to the former ROC Government, and the effects of the interna-
tional community's general recognition of the PRC Government as
the sole legitimate government representing China as a whole, in-
cluding Taiwan. Section II deals with the assertion that Taiwan is al-
ready a sovereign State because it already meets the criteria for
1. See Responses to Questions Submitted b" Deutsche Welle, (visited March
25, 2000) <http://wwwv.dsis.org.tv/database/chinataiwarlee_two_statese.htm>
[hereinafter Responses] (reporting statements of Lee Teng-hui that amendments to
Taiwan's Constitution set special state-to-state relations between China and Tai-
wan); see also Spokesman on Lee Teng-Hui Separatist Malice, (visited March 28,
2000) <http://202.99.23.245/englishl99907/12enc_990712001028TopNews.
html> (reporting statements by Lee Teng-hui and other Taiwanese officials that
relations between China and Taiwan are as between two states); People's Daily, 10
July 1999; New York Times, 10 July 1999. Since the completion of this Essay in
late February 2000, some major changes have taken place in the political life of
Taiwan. In March 2000, the opposition party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progres-
sive Party (DPP), won the local general election, resulting in (1) the selection of
DPP "presidential" candidate Chen Shui-bian to take office on May 20, 2000 as the
new leader of the Taiwanese authorities, and (2) the loss of power by Kuomintang
(KMT) for the first time in the local politics. See Terry McCarthy, Chen's Tri-
umph, CNN.com Asia Now, vol. 155, no. 12 (visited Mar. 27, 2000)
<www.cnn.com/ASIANOW/time/magazine/20010327/coveri.html.>. Over angry
protesters and demonstrators blaming Lee Teng-hui for KMT's defeat, Lee re-
signed as KMT Chairman. See Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui Resigns as Party Chief,
CNN.com.Asianow (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <www.cnn.comI2000!ASIANOW/
east/03/24/bc.taiwan.politics.reut/index.html>.
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statehood. Upon a brief review of the basic criteria for statehood, I
argue that while there is a permanent population in Taiwan, the
province can hardly be said to have met the requirements of a "terri-
tory" and a "government" because of its lack of "legal title" in both
categories, and it certainly does not meet the criterion of "sover-
eignty" or "independence" because it does not possess the legal
competency to represent China as a whole, or Taiwan as part of
China, on the international plane. In Section III, I explore the inap-
plicability of the principle of self-determination to Taiwan. After
stating that linking the concept of self-determination with Taiwan in
order to support its independence would amount to an abuse of the
concept, I conclude that neither the Taiwanese authorities nor the in-
habitants in Taiwan have the right to unilaterally secede Taiwan from
China absent a constitutional structure or consent on the part of the
Chinese Government and its 1.3 billion people permitting such se-
cession.
I. TAIWAN'S ATTRIBUTES AND THE NATURE OF
THE TAIWAN ISSUE
There are several possible categories for Taiwanese secessionists
and their overseas supporters. One category concedes that Taiwan,
under current legal framework, is not in itself a State, but endeavors
eventually to turn Taiwan into a so-called independent nation. A sec-
ond category considers Taiwan a political entity having an equal
status with Beijing and aims at attaining eventual independence by
expanding Taiwan's "international living space". A third category
openly averts that Taiwan or the "Republic of China in Taiwan" is
already an independent nation.2 A fourth category calls for a formal
declaration of independence. Lee Teng-hui, at different times,
seemed to fall into each of the former three categories. The only
thing he had not done thus far was formally declare independence for
Taiwan. Despite his past actions, we are now certain that Lee, al-
though often unpredictable, exposed himself to the world as a naked
separatist by moving closer towards creating "two Chinas" or "one
China, one Taiwan". People are more convinced than ever that Lee
essentially stood on the same line as Tai dufenzi, "independence for
Taiwan" activists, both within and without the island province.
2. See Responses, supra note 1 (reporting statement of Lee Teng-hui that de-
claring independence would essentially be superfluous).
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To support their claims for Taiwan's independence, the seces-
sionists and their supporters either ignore or distort historical facts
and present realities relating to the attributes of Taiwan. Some politi-
cians, scholars and media in the West, particularly in the United
States, are also not willing to accept that Taiwan is a part of China
and that there is only one China. They will refer to Taiwan, or the so-
called "Republic of China," as a State' before ever acknowledging
territorial sovereignty of China over Taiwan. They at most state that
China regards Taiwan as a renegade province, as if, to them, this
were not necessarily so." True, China does take Taiwan as an inalien-
able part of its territory, but this is a position based upon solid foun-
dations in history, fact, and law.
A. HISTORICAL BASIS FOR CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIWAN
Historically, Taiwan has been part of China since ancient times.
Ancient Chinese called this island Daiviuan in the primitive era. In
the Warring States period (475-221 B.C.), the island was renamed
Daoyi and Yizhou.' Contacts between the Chinese people and the
Taiwan Island, then known as Yizhzou, took place as early as during
the Qin (221-206 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) Dynasties.'
In the Three-Warring States period (220-280 A.D.), the develop-
ment of the Yizhou island by the Chinese people was documented in
Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer, an official annual compiled by
Shen Ying of the Wu State of that period. Surviving historical rec-
ords indicate that in the year of 230, two admirals of the Wu State,
Wei Wen and Zhuge Zhi, led ten thousand soldiers to Yizhou.' The
3. See id. (recounting Lee Teng-hui's statement that Taiwan has been a sover-
eign state since it was founded in 1912).
4. See id. (declaring Beijing's characterization of Taiwan as a renegade prov-
ince as untrue).
5. See CIHAI (THE SEA OF WORDs) 477 (Shanghai Dictionary Publishing
House, abridged ed. 1979); see also Ru Xin, China has Indisputable Sovereignty
over Taiwan, PEOPLE'S DAILY (overseas ed.), Oct. 31, 1995, at 5.
6. See CIHAI, supra note 5, at 477.
7. See The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China, BEIJING REVIEW,
Sept. 6-12, 1993 at I [hereinafter Wh1fite Paper] (recounting the common history of
China and Taiwan to demonstrate that Taiwan has long been a part of China).
8. See CIHAI, supra note 5, at 477.
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state of Wu in the third century A.D. and the Sui Dynasty in the Sev-
enth century A.D., sent several expeditions to Taiwan consisting of
over ten thousand men each. 9
In the Sui Dynasty (581-618 A.D.), the island was renamed Li-
uqiu.'1 This latter name continued through the Tang (618-907 A.D.),
Song (960-1279 A.D.) and Yuan (1279-1368 A.D.) Dynasties, and
well into most part of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644 A.D.)." By the
end of the Ming era, the name Taiwan was used to refer to part and
eventually the whole of the island. 2
Despite relatively shorter periods of foreign invasion and domina-
tion in modem times, the presence and settlement of Chinese people
on the island in addition to China's actual exercise of authority
throughout history supports the character of Taiwan as part of
China.'3 The Chinese Government effectively established and exer-
cised jurisdiction over Taiwan in various dynasties. The Southern
Song Dynasty (1127-1279 A.D.), for example, set up a garrison in
Penghu and placed the territory under the jurisdiction of Jinjiang
County, Quanzhou Prefecture, of Fujian Province.14 In the Yuan and
Ming Dynasties, the Chinese Government continued to exercise such
jurisdiction by establishing and maintaining an Administration of
Patrol and Inspection (Xun Jian Si) in Penghu. '
In 1624, the Dutch invaded Taiwan and occupied the island for 38
years.' 6 In 1661, General Zheng Chenggong (known in the West as
9. See White Paper, supra note 7, at I.
10. See id. ati.
11. See CIHAI, supra note 5, at 477; see also Run Xin, supra note 5.
12. See CIHA, supra note 5, at 477.
13. See White Paper, supra note 7 at I (finding that Taiwan's cultural traditions
are founded in Chinese traditions, a fact that as not been affected by Japanese oc-
cupation).
14. See CIHAI, supra note 5, at 477.
15. See id; see also White Paper, supra note 7, at II (providing examples of
administrative bodies established by China to govern Taiwan). The Yuan Dynasty
established a patrol and inspection agency in Penghu. During the mid and late 16th
century, the Ming Dynasty reinstated this agency after it had been abolished and
sent reinforcements to Penhu to thwart foreign aggressors. See id.
16. See White Paper, supra note 7, at II (stating that the Dutch initially occu-
pied the southern part of Taiwan and in 1642 seized the northern part from the
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Koxinga or Cheng Ch'eng Kung) and his soldiers sailed across the
Taiwan Strait from Fujian, and, in 1662, he expelled the armed
forces of the Netherlands, thus completely recovering what he called
"the native land of our ancestors" (xianren gutt).'" General Zheng
established Chengtian Prefecture on the island under the jurisdiction
of Fujian Province' and "subsequently, the Qing government ex-
panded the administrative structure in Taiwan, thereby strengthening
its rule over the territory....,,9
In 1684, the Qing Dynasty set up a Taiwan-Xiamen Patrol Com-
mand and a Taiwan Prefecture Administration, still under the juris-
diction of Fujian Province.20 The Command and the Prefecture in
turn had jurisdiction over three counties on the island: Taiwan
County (now Tainan), Fengshan County (now Gaoxiong) and Zhuluo
County, now called Jiayi.2'
In 1721, Emperor Kangxi created an office of imperial supervisor
for the inspection of Taiwan, and replaced the Taiwan-Xiamen" Pa-
trol Command with the name "Prefecture Administration of Taiwan
and Xiamen". The jurisdiction of this Prefecture Administration, also
under Fujian, covered the above named counties as well as the sub-
sequently created Zhanghua County and Danshui Canton.2'
In 1727, Emperor Yongzheng restructured the administration on
the island by establishing the Prefecture Administration of Taiwan,
again under Fujian Province.4 This Prefecture Administration, which
was later renamed Prefecture Command for Patrol of Taiwan, incor-
porated the newly established Penghu Canton along with previously
existing counties and cantons.-'
Spaniards who had occupied that part since 1626).
17. See Ji Chonwei, History May Not be Distorted, PEOPLES DAILY, Nov. 1,
1995, at 5.
18. See White Paper, supra note 7, at 11.
19. See id. at 1I.
20. See id. at II.
21. See id. at I.
22. See id. at I.
23. See id. at I.
24. See White Paper, supra note 7, at II.
25. See id. at II.
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In 1875, in order to upgrade the administration of Taiwan, Em-
peror Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty created Taibei Prefecture, Jilong
Canton, Danshui County, Xinzhu County and Yilan County."
In 1885, Emperor Guangxu formally upgraded Taiwan to the
status of a full province covering three prefectures, one sub-
prefecture, eleven counties and five cantons . During the tenure of
office of Liu Mingchuan, the first Governor of Taiwan, "railways
were laid, mines opened, telegraph service installed, merchant ships
built, industries started and new-style schools set up. Considerable
social, economic, and cultural advancement in Taiwan was achieved
as a result .
In 1894, Japan launched a war of aggression against China, and
coerced the losing party, the Qing government, to sign the humiliat-
ing Treaty of Shimonoseki (Treaty of Maguan) in 1895, under which
Taiwan and Penghu were ceded to Japan. 9 This began a history of
fifty years of Japanese colonial reign of Taiwan against the will of
the Chinese people, including the inhabitants on Taiwan. 30 Efforts by
the Chinese people on the island and the mainland to resist Japanese
occupation and return Taiwan to the motherland never ceased."
During the Second World War, the Chinese Government, in its
Declaration of War against Japan, proclaimed to abrogate all treaties,
conventions, agreements, and contracts regarding relations between
China and Japan, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki." The proc-
lamation declared China's resumption of sovereignty over Taiwan,
Penghu and four northeastern provinces, emphasizing that China
26. See id. at II.
27. See id. at II.
28. See id. at 1I.
29. See id. at II; see also JIANG ZEMIN, Continue to Promote the Reunification
of the Motherland (visited March 25, 2000) <http://www.chinaembassy.org/
cgiin/press.pl?65> (stating that despite the fact that Taiwan has been separated
from China in the past, the Chinese continue to promote reunification of Taiwan
with mainland China).
30. See White Paper, supra note 7 at II.
31. See id. at II (stating that people on the mainland gave donations or volun-
teered for the effort to fight the Japanese).
32. See id. at 11.
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would recover these territories." After China won the war against
Japanese aggression in 1945, the Chinese government reinstated its
administrative authority in Taiwan Province, thereby formally re-
suming sovereignty of China over the territory."
In 1949, the defeated Kuomintang forces retreated from the main-
land to Taiwan.35 Since then, the Taiwan Strait has separated the is-
land province from the motherland. This internal and temporary
separation, however, does not change the attributes of Taiwan as an
integral territorial part of China.
B. LEGAL BASES FOR CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAIWAN
1. Historic Title as a Legal Basis
The sovereignty of China over Taiwan is also firmly established in
law. China's legal title to Taiwan is inseparable from the historical
facts relating to China's actual exercise of jurisdiction over Taiwan.
Despite the allegation that in certain periods in history the Chinese
government's control over Taiwan was weak and fragile, such con-
trol "was particularly strong and continuous" in comparison with
other Chinese frontiers.36 China's long-time display of effective
authority over the island exceeds all the requirements of international
law for the acquisition and maintenance of territorial title either by
way of occupation or prescription.
33. See id. at II (referring to the Chinese Government's declaration of war
against Japan); see also Ru Xin, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that China has sover-
eignty over Taiwan).
34. See Ru Xin, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that China has sovereignty over
Taiwan).
35. See White Paper, supra note 7, at III (stating that once the Republic of
China was overthrown and the People's Republic of China proclaimed as the sole
government of China, officials of the Kuomintang clique, which was associated
with the Republic of China, left, seeking refuge in Taiwan).
36. See Jonathan I. Charney & J.R.V. Prescott, SovereigntY Issues between the
People's Republic of China and the Republic qf China. 16 (Jan. 14, 2000) (on file
with the author) (finding that before China relinquished Taiwan to Japan. rebel-
lions were not abnormal).
37. See Jianming Shen, Iternational Law Rules and Historical Evidences Sup-
porting China's Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 HASTINGS 1N'L & COMP.
L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1997) (discussing five modes of acquisition of territory: occupa-
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2. Invalidity of the Shimonoseki Treaty
The dejure territorial attributes of Taiwan to China remained un-
interrupted by the Qing Government's cession "in perpetuity",. 3" Al-
though the island ceded to Japan by an unequal treaty, the validity of
the cession was in itself questionable because the Qing Government
signed it under extreme duress. 9 Under modem and contemporary
international law, a treaty is void and invalid ab initio if entered into
under coercion or fraud.40
According to Professor Wang Tieya, the Treaty of Shimonoseki
was one of the many unequal treaties imposed upon China by foreign
powers." Among all Sino-foreign treaties from the 1842 Sino-British
Treaty of Nanjing to the early part of the 20th century, "very few
treaties were equal".42 During this period of time, "what applied in
China's foreign relations were not principles and rules of interna-
tional law, but rather unequal treaties '43 that were concluded under
tion, prescription, accretion, cession, and subjugation or annexation).
38. The Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded Taiwan and some other territories of
China to Japan "in perpetuity". See GUOnI GUANXI SHI (17 SHIA ZHONGYE - 1945)
(A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (MID- 17" CENTURY - 1945)) 191-192
(Wang Changzu, He Chunchao & Wu Shimin, eds., Beijing: Law Publishing
House, 1986). Such perpetual cession, however, has no legal and practical signifi-
cance given the unequal nature of the treaty made under duress, China's refusal to
recognize the treaty, and Japan's renunciation of any interest and title in Taiwan.
Hong Kong Island per se was also ceded to Great Britain in perpetuity, but that
fact similarly never precluded China from maintaining its sovereignty over Hong
Kong and regaining physical possession of it.
39. See White Paper, supra note 7, at II (stating that because of defeat to the
Japanese, the Qing government was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki).
40. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980, art 52, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 875, 891(1969) (nullifying any treaty obtained by force or the threat of
force). The International Law Commission, responsible for drafting the text of the
Convention, concluded that the principle concerning the legitimacy of a treaty ob-
tained by illegal threat or use of force is lex lata in current international law. See
I.L.C. Final Draft, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 177, U.N. Doc.
A/NC.4/SER.A/1966.
41. See WANG TIEYA, GUOJI FA YIN LUN (AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW) 387-88 (Peking University Press 1998).
42. See id. at 390.
43. See id. at 391.
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the use or threat of armed force or coercion." As early as 1924, Dr.
Sun Yet-sien, the founding father of the Republic of China, declared
his intent to abolish all unequal treaties between China and foreign
nations. On May 11, 1927, the Nationalist Government issued a
"Declaration to Abolish All Unequal Treaties by Appropriate
Means." 6 On May 31, 1931, the Chinese National Assembly de-
clared that "the Chinese people do not recognize all unequal treaties
hitherto imposed upon China by foreign States."! More specifically,
the Government of the Republic of China, during the War of Resis-
tance against Japan, abrogated all unequal treaties between China
and Japan, including the Treaty of Shimonoseki." When China de-
clared war against Japan during the Second World War "the Chinese
Government proclaimed that all treaties, conventions, agreements,
and contracts regarding relations between China and Japan, including
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, had been abrogated ... [and] ... stressed
that China would recover Taiwan, Penghu and the four northeastern
provinces.49
After the founding of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"), the
new Chinese Government solemnly declared that it would not recog-
nize the validity of any unequal treaties imposed upon prior govern-
ments of China.0 It is thus beyond doubt that the 1895 Treaty of
Shimonoseki could not and can not validly bind the Chinese Gov-
ernment.
Furthermore, under a 1952 "Peace Treaty" between Japan and the
"Republic of China" ("ROC"), Japan agreed to regard all treaties and
agreements it had entered into with China before December 1941 as
invalid.5' While the 1952 treaty is not valid for the People's Republic
44. See id. at 392.
45. See id. at 398.
46. See id. at 399.
47. See id. at 399.
48. See id. at 399 (noting that China declared null and void all unequal treaties
between China and Germany, Italy, and Japan).
49. See White Paper, supra note, 7 at II.
50. See, e.g., GuoJI FA (INTERNATIONAL LAW) 18 (Wang Tieya & Wei Min
eds., 1981); MU YAPING ET AL., DANGDAI GuoJi FA LUN (A TREATISE OF
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW) 36 (1998).
51. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing the 1952 Treaty
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of China in a technical sense, it nevertheless manifests Japan's uni-
lateral commitments which, given all the circumstances, are legally
binding upon Japan. By undertaking to nullify, rather than to termi-
nate, the Treaty of Shimonoseki and other unequal treaties, Japan ar-
guably lost its right, title, or claim, if any, to Taiwan ab initio, not
simply as of 1941 or 1952. That is to say, any legal title to Taiwan
that accrued to Japan as of 1895 no longer exists. In any case, the
PRC Government considered the Treaty of Shimonoseki and all
other coerced unequal treaties invalid ab initio. In that sense, China
never legally lost her sovereignty over Taiwan, but merely lost her
physical control over it until the recovery of 1945.
Notwithstanding, whether the nullification of the Treaty of Shi-
monoseki took effect in 1895, 1941, 1949 or 1952 is not important. It
is most important that such nullification, no matter when taking ef-
fect, has practically the same effect. If the 1895 treaty ever became
effective, it was at least invalidated by the Chinese Government's ab-
rogation and Japan's commitment to accept such abrogation. Since
China held the sole title before the 1895 treaty, the only natural and
logical result of the nullification of the treaty is that, Taiwan remains
part of China.
3. Legal Effects of the Cairo/Potsdam Declarations
More importantly, China obtained full resumption of defacto and
de jure sovereignty over Taiwan following Japan's surrender in
August 1945. A series of international legal instruments and Japan's
own commitments affirm and guarantee such resumption of sover-
eignty. On December 1, 1943, China, Great Britain, and the United
States issued the well-known Cairo Declaration. It proclaimed,
among other things, that "Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in
the Pacific which she seized or occupied since the beginning of the
First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan stole from
the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pesca-
dores [Penghu], shall be restored to the Republic of China." 2
of Peace between the so-called "Republic of China" and Japan).
52. See Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
and Prime Minister Churchill in North Africa, Dec. 1, 1943, 9 DEP'T ST. BULL.,
1943, 393 (providing a description of the three nations' military operations against
Japan).
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On July 26, 1945, these three powers (later joined by the Soviet
Union) signed the Potsdam Proclamation, emphasizing that -[t]he
terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out", and that "Japa-
nese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido,
Kyushu, Shikoku, and such other minor islands as we determine.""
One might argue that the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam
Proclamation were not treaties and therefore not legally binding. It is
true that these instruments may lack the characteristics of typical
treaties from the point of view of formality because they were not in
the form of a seemingly binding agreement. Further, Japan was not a
party to either declaration. However, one can not ignore that these
instruments certainly had significant legal effects.
First, these instruments, touching upon certain important political
matters, manifested the meeting of minds of the major allied powers
near the end of World War II, and were intended to be, and were in-
deed subsequently, carried out after Japan's surrender. In this sense,
it is arguable that these declarations amounted to two legally binding
pacts between the victorious major allied powers. They would bind
not only the parties as the major victors-to-be, but also Japan as the
aggressor and the defeated-to-be, whose prior agreement to the terms
set forth therein was not necessary.
Second, if these instruments were not formal treaties, they were at
least quasi-legally binding instruments. Specifically, they, inter alia,
set the tones for post-war settlement of political boundaries in Asia
and imposed basic conditions and terms upon Japan, which was soon
to be defeated. Again, whether Japan liked them or not, it had no
choice but to unconditionally accept such terms. Thus, these declara-
tions were at least legally significant for the signatory parties as well
as Japan.
Third, these declarations reiterated the formal recognition by the
United States, Great Britain and the then Soviet Union that Taiwan
belonged to China, although "stolen" by Japan from China, and that
it "shall be restored to China." Such express recognition cannot be
53. See Proclamation Defining Terms For Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1946.
13 DEP'T ST. BULL., 1945, 137, para. 8 (noting the limitation on Japanese sover-
eignty following the Cairo Declaration in addition to other terms of the Japanese
surrender).
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without legal consequence. In fact, the rest of the international com-
munity at large has never challenged that recognition. Instead, most
States followed suit by recognizing Taiwan as part of China.
Finally, the relevant terms set forth in the Cairo Declaration and
incorporated in the Potsnam Proclamation became active upon Ja-
pan's surrender and by binding unilateral undertakings. Under the in-
strument of Japan's surrender of August 1945, Japan undertook "the
provisions in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments
of the United States, China and Great Britain on July 26, 1945 at
Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics. 5 4 Japan's instrument of surrender was indeed an
unconditional acceptance of the major terms contained in the Cairo
Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. If the declarations were
merely an unconditional "offer", then the instrument of Japan's sur-
render would constitute a mirror image "acceptance", thereby com-
pleting the process of creating a virtual "treaty" comprising three or
several instruments.
4. The 1951 San Francesco Peace Treaty
Under the San Francesco multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan
of 1951, Japan once again formally affirmed its renunciation of all its
claims to Taiwan and other territories it took from China and other
countries.5 The Treaty specifically provides that "Japan renounces
all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores."56
Some argue that the 1951 Peace Treaty superceded the Cairo and
Potsdam declarations and did not identify to whom Taiwan should be
returned. Therefore the treaty did not explicitly cede Japan's sover-
eignty over Taiwan to any specific party.17 For those supporting this
argument, the Peace Treaty formally abolished Japan's claim under
the Treaty of Shimonoseki. "As a result," write Charney and
54. See White Paper, supra note 7, at III.
55. See Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter
1951 Peace Treaty] (designating sovereignty over land Japan had seized).
56. See id., art. 2.
57. See, e.g., Lung-chu Chen, Taiwan's Current International Legal Status, 32
N. ENGL. L. REV. 675, 677 (1998) (indicating that Taiwan was separated from Ja-
pan but not joined with any other country).
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Prescott, the 1951 Peace Treaty does "not resolve the question of
whether the ROC or the PRC has sovereignty over Taiwan."" This
argument, although extensively utilized by the DPP and other pro-
secessionist forces in Taiwan, is not based on any legal merit.
In the first place, nothing in the 1951 Peace Treaty or in its "leg-
islative history" suggests any intention for it to "supercede" the Cairo
Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. Rather, the purpose of
the Peace Treaty, to which China is not a party, was to formalize and
itemize the principles embodied in the Cairo and Potsdam declara-
tions. Even if the Peace Treaty were designed to "supercede" the two
wartime declarations, it would not effect China, who did not partici-
pate in the making of that treaty.
In addition, China had already resumed sovereignty over Taiwan
under a bundle of legally binding instruments and its continued sov-
ereignty over Taiwan did not rely upon any reference or lack thereof
to China as the beneficiary in the Peace Treaty. It is true that the
1951 Peace Treaty did not specify the recipient of Taiwan and other
relevant territories (such as the Spratlys and the Paracels) which for-
merly belonged to China, however, such specification was not le-
gally necessary. After all, the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proc-
lamation and Japan's instrument of surrender had indeed solved the
problem. The aggregate of these three instruments made it clear that
Japan was to return Taiwan and other relevant territories to the then
"Republic of China", and China indeed reestablished control and
sovereignty over Taiwan shortly after Japan's surrender.
Further, even if we assume the Cairo and Potsdam declarations
had not specified the recipient of Taiwan, the issue would still be a
non-issue as to who would have sovereignty over Taiwan after Ja-
pan's renunciation. Taiwan had been a part of Chinese territory be-
fore Japan pillaged it from China under an unequal and invalid
treaty. When Japan renounced its claim to Taiwan upon its defeat in
World War II, it was only natural for China to resume sovereignty
regardless of whether Japan or any peace treaty identified China as
the recipient.
Neither the Chinese Central Government nor the Taiwanese
authorities received an invitation to the peace conference. China was
58. See Charney & Prescott, supra note 36.
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not a party to the Peace treaty and therefore did not have an obliga-
tion to abide by the terms of the treaty. China's rights and interests
under international law in general and under the aggregate of the
Cairo/Potsdam instruments in particular would not be affected by
anything written into the 1951 Peace Treaty. That is to say, China's
natural and logical recovery of Taiwan did not depend on the terms
of the San Francesco Peace Treaty, in the creation of which China
took no part. Japan's formal renunciation of claims to Taiwan and
other relevant territories under the Peace Treaty merely happened to
reaffirm the arrangements under the legally binding Cairo/Potsdam
instruments. Moreover, even if the 1951 Treaty changed the recipient
of Taiwan to the United States, or if it provided for the separation of
Taiwan from China, it would not result in any legally binding effects
upon the Chinese government.
5. The 1952 Peace Treaty
On April 28 1952, the authorities in Taiwan, in the name of the
ROC, entered into a bilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan."' Article 2
of the Treaty recognized that under the San Francesco Peace Treaty,
Japan had "renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa)
and Penghu (The Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the
Paracel Islands." 6
As far as Taiwan is concerned, this bilateral treaty did nothing
more than restate what the 1951 multilateral Peace Treaty purported
to provide. In turn, the 1951 treaty did nothing other than confirm al-
ready existing status quo and legal arrangements under the Cairo
Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the instrument of Ja-
pan's surrender.
Further, the 1952 treaty was not "entered into" until after a suc-
cessful and effective succession of government occurred in China. In
1949 PRC replaced ROC, and therefore the so-called ROC could no
longer make treaties on behalf of China. Accordingly, the 1952 treaty
has no binding effect upon the Chinese Government and is therefore
legally insignificant.
59. See Treaty of Peace, Apr. 28, 1952, China-Japan, 138 U.N.T.S. 3 [herein-
after 1952 Peace Treaty] (resolving territorial disputes after the war).
60. See id., art. 2.
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Nevertheless, concurring with Charney and Prescott, I am pre-
pared to say that the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation,
the 1951 Peace Treaty, and in some respects the 1952 bilateral Peace
Treaty constituted "the chain of instruments returning [Taiwan]
and.., all the islands that appertain to or belong to [Taiwan] to
China,"6' provided that the 1951 and 1952 treaties may be said to en-
hance that chain rather than to make it complete.
Further, technically speaking, the 1952 treaty may serve as mani-
festations of Japan's binding unilateral statements or commitments
concerning certain essential political issues. These key issues include
the reaffirmation of its renunciation of any right, claim, or title to
Taiwan, and the undertaking that "all treaties, conventions and
agreements concluded before December 9, 1941, between China and
Japan, are invalid as a consequence of the war."' This latter under-
taking, together with China's own abrogation of all unequal treaties
with Japan, is significant because even in the absence of the
Cairo/Potsdam instruments and the 1951 and 1952 treaties, China
would be the sole country entitled to recover Taiwan.
C. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER
TAIWAN
1. PRC's Continuity of the ROC and Its Legal Effects
As noted above, when Japan surrendered in 1945, the then Nation-
alist Government of the Republic of China reinstated China's physi-
cal sovereignty over the administration of Taiwan Province. An un-
fortunate civil war ensued between the Nationalist forces and the
People's Liberation Army led by the Chinese Communist Party. By
the latter part of 1949, the Nationalist forces were completely de-
feated on the Chinese mainland. Consequently, with the regime of
the Republic of China overthrown, the Central People's Government
of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949 soon replaced
it. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his forces retreated from the
mainland to the Province of Taiwan. Since that time, Taiwan Prov-
ince has been under the administration of the Taiwanese authorities
61. See Charney & Prescott, supra note 36.
62. See 1952 Peace Treaty, supra note 59, art. 4.
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in the name of the so-called "Republic of China," while the new PRC
Government administered the main part of China.
When the PRC Government replaced the ROC Government in
1949, a matter of succession took place. This succession was not a
succession of State, but a succession of government. The change
from the ROC to the PRC was not a change of State, but a change in
the name, form, and system of the State. The State of China's inter-
national personality remained unaffected by the revolutionary change
of government. The PRC is in fact the legal continuation of the ROC
and therefore entitled, under rules and principles of international law
relating to State continuity and government succession, to every
piece of territory over which the ROC had sovereignty on and before
October 1, 1949.
Truly, the nationalist regime, after fleeing to Taiwan, continued to
use the name of the "Republic of China". Nevertheless, this self-
claimed "Republic of China" is not the same "Republic of China"
that was overthrown. The so-called "ROC" or "ROC in Taiwan,"
however confusing it may be, is not the continuity of the former Re-
public of China that existed de jure between 1911 and 1949. The
PRC Government replaced the former Republic both in fact and in
law.
Although the regime in Taiwan exercised de facto administration
of Taiwan Province for the past some fifty years, it is merely a spe-
cial local government. It is a local government regardless of the
name it adopts and incapable of representing the State of China on
the international plane. It is a special local government in the sense
that it has separately administered Taiwan Province not physically
controlled by the central government. By recognizing the special
nature of the Taiwanese authorities, we acknowledge the fact that the
province of Taiwan has been under a very distinct and separate ad-
ministration from the PRC Government. Emphasizing the local char-
acter of the regime in Taiwan means that the province, albeit under
distinct and separate administration, is under the sovereignty of the
State of China. The international community at large considers the
PRC government China's sole legitimate government. On the inter-
national plane, a State cannot have two equally representative gov-
ernments. The international community generally recognizes the
PRC Government as the sole legitimate Government of China and
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Taiwan as part of China. These general expressions of recognition all
suffice to render the regime in Taiwan as no more than a special lo-
cal government. This, however, does not prevent the two sides of the
Strait from engaging in political, trade and other dialogues and ne-
gotiations based on equality and mutual benefits.
There is a fundamental difference between sovereignty and ad-
ministration. In ordinary circumstances, sovereignty and administra-
tion overlap in part because the entity that exercises central admini-
stration is usually the one with sovereignty. In extraordinary
circumstances, however, it is possible for different parts of a State's
territory to come under two or more separate administrations without
affecting the State's entire sovereignty and ownership. Such was the
case of China in the 1920s when there were two separate administra-
tions, but China as a whole remained the same, and its sovereignty
over all parts of China also remained unaffected. Currently, there
exists a similar situation in the cross-Strait relationship. The two
sides of the Taiwan Strait constitute one State and are subject to the
same State's sovereignty even though under two different admini-
strations. Dr. Chien-kuo Wu, a former "congressman" of Taiwan's
"National Assembly" and presently a visiting fellow at the Interna-
tional Affairs Council of Yale University, characterizes this distinc-
tion as one between "sovereignty" (zhuzqzian) and "jurisdiction"
(zhiqtan), with the former denoting to ownership and legal title, and
the latter referring to custodial right and the right to use. He observed
that although the sovereignty and jurisdiction of a State normally re-
side in the same government, different "governments" could exercise
it. In this case, the sovereignty resides in the State that the interna-
tional community recognizes as the sovereignty holder, and the
"government" exercising separate jurisdiction cannot unilaterally
deny the sovereignty of the entire State.6'
The regime in Taiwan is a special government and is, therefore,
competent to exercise a broad range of governmental authorities over
matters appertaining to the people and property of the province.
However, some matters should remain under the control of the cen-
tral government. For example, the regime in Taiwan certainly is not
63. C.K. Wu, Chedi Pepan Li Denghui "Liangguo Lun" de Miuwu (Thor-
oughly Animadverting on the Fallacy of Lee Tung-hui's "Two State Theory") 3
(Jan. 2000, on file with the author).
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competent to dispose of or otherwise change any part of the Chinese
territory, including the Taiwan Island and its auxiliary islands. Nei-
ther is it competent to unilaterally separate Taiwan from the entire
country.64 Any change in the territory of China's is a matter for the
central government in Beijing to decide.
When Charney and Prescott recognized that China clearly resumed
sovereignty over Taiwan after Japan's surrender because of a chain
of international instruments, they raised the question of "what gov-
ernment(s) represent(s) 'China.' 65 However, given the succession by
the PRC Government to the former ROC Government, the question
is a non-issue.
Although the Cairo Declaration provided for the return of Taiwan
to the "Republic of China", it in fact referred to the State of China
whose form of government changed from the Imperial Qing Gov-
ernment, to the war-lord Government of the Republic of China in
Beijing, to the Nationalist Government in Nanjing, (and Chongqing
during the War of Resistance against Japan) and finally to the Gov-
ernment of the People's Republic of China. The reference to "Re-
public of China" in the Cairo Declaration denotes the State of China,
and is thus not related to the "ROC" or "ROC in Taiwan" currently
in use by the regime in Taiwan. It is beyond question that the Gov-
ernment of the PRC is the only central Chinese government capable
of representing the State of China and handling territorial matters.
Until in the 1990s, the Taiwanese authorities purported to repre-
sent the entire China, and claimed themselves as the sole legitimate
government of the whole country. That alleged representation was of
course a fiction. Since 1990s, the regime in Taiwan turned to a more
dangerous and detrimental direction: A "Republic of China in Tai-
wan" no longer covering the mainland, a claim designed for, or at
least working towards, the formal independence of Taiwan. The
central government in Beijing resolutely rejected both claims. In ad-
dition, the international community recognized neither claim of the
Taiwan authorities at large.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 193-208 (discussing unilateral seces-
sion, minority rights and harmful consequences of abusive self-determination).
65. See Charney & Prescott, supra note 36.
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2. Recognition by 160+ States
As noted above, the general international community has over-
whelmingly recognized the sovereignty of China over Taiwan. Since
the founding of the People's Republic of China, more than 160
countries have established diplomatic relations with China. As a re-
sult of such diplomatic relations, all these countries recognize three
inseparable things: (1) that there is only but one China in the world;
(2) that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole
legitimate government of China, and; (3) that Taiwan is an inalien-
able territorial part of China. China has made recognition of these
three factors a precondition for all cases of mutual recognition and
establishment of diplomatic relations.
Following Lee Teng-hui's pronouncement of his "Two-States"
theory July 9, 1999, a majority of those countries with diplomatic
relations with China, including the United States, officially reaf-
firmed their "one-China" policy and their recognition of China's
sovereignty over Taiwan. 6' While Taiwan's "money diplomacy" en-
abled the regime in Taiwan to maintain "diplomatic relations" with a
handful of States and the Vatican City and, at times, even to lure
some developing countries away from recognizing and maintaining
official relations with the PRC Government, the overall trend in the
last five decades is obvious. More States recognize the PRC Gov-
ernment instead of the "ROC". In 1949, eight States entered into
diplomatic relations with the newly established PRC. By 1956,
twenty-five States established diplomatic relations with the PRC
Government.67 By 1969, the number doubled to some fifty States.' In
1972, particularly following the resumption of China's representation
at the United Nations, the number of States with diplomatic relations
with the PRC dramatically increased to about eighty-eight9 In 1979,
66. See, e.g., C.K. Wu, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that more than 140 countries
have reaffirmed their one-China policy since Lee's July 1999 statement).
67. See Tang Jiaxuan, Xin Zhongguo Waijiao de Guanghui Licheng (A Glori-
ous Course of New China's Diplomac') (visited Mar. 29, 2000)
<http://www.ftnprc.gov.cn/zt/zt_01/wjbztwz-tjh I.htm>.
68. See id.
69. See Principles Governing the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with
Other Countries (visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http://Nww.china-embassy.org/cgi-
bin/china.pl?H3> (providing a list of countries with which China has established
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more than 110 States maintained such relations with Beijing.0 The
number kept growing at a steady pace in the following two decades:
about 128 by the end of 1985, about 141 by the end of 1991,7' and
161 by 1999.72 Currently, about only twenty-nine States, mostly in
Central America and Africa, are maintaining official relations with
Taiwan. These facts speak for themselves.
3. Recognition by International Organizations
With respect to China, the United Nations and other inter-
governmental organizations take the same position as the majority of
nation-States. China's seat at the United Nations should have trans-
ferred from the former nationalist government of China to the PRC
Government as soon as the latter replaced the former on the main-
land in 1949. As early as November 15, 1949 and January 8, 1950,
Premier Zhou Enlai telegraphed the President of the General Assem-
bly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, demanding for
the expulsion of "the illegal representatives of the Kuomingtang re-
gime." Furthermore, Premier Zhou claimed the PRC's lawful rights
of representation at the UN.7' At the time, however, the United States
and its allies dominated the United Nations. They repeatedly rejected
any legitimate form of PRC representation at the main bodies of the
UN. Further, the PRC's seat and other international organizations
serving as the UN's specialized agencies were also blocked. The
General Assembly adopted Resolution 396 (V), providing that the
position of the General Assembly on China's membership be taken
into account in other bodies of the United Nations system so that "a
Member State [w]ould not be represented in a different manner in
various organs of the United Nations." 7' The rise of the third world in
the United Nations finally led to the resolution of the issue of
diplomatic relations.
70. See SHIJIE DITU CE (WORLD ATLAS), 4 (1972).
7 1. See supra note 69.
72. See <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/bjzl/bjziztjstwwt_.02.htm>.
73. See GUOJI GUANXI SHI (1945-1980) (A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1945-1980)) 132, n. 1 (He Chunchao, Zhang Jiliang, & Zhang Zhi,
eds., 1986).
74. See UNITED NATIONS, I REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED NATIONS
ORGANS 286 (1955).
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China's representation at this international organization and its vari-
ous bodies in 1971.
We are well reminded of the historically significant Resolution
2758/XXVI (1971), which was adopted at the twenty-sixth session of
the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority. In this resolu-
tion, the General Assembly considered that "the restoration of the
lawful rights of the [PRC] is essential both for the protection of the
Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United Na-
tions must serve under the Charter."7 It clearly and unequivocally
recognized "that the representatives of the Government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China
to the United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one
of the five permanent representatives of the Security Council.""b Ac-
cordingly, it decided "to restore all rights of the People's Republic of
China in the United Nations, and to expel the representatives of Tai-
wan "from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United
Nations and in all the organizations related to it."-
Resolution 2758/XXVI is significant in that it reaffirmed the "one
China" principle by deciding resolutely to restore the lawful seat of
the People's Republic of China at the United Nations and in the same
resolute manner to expel the so-called "Republic of China" from the
United Nations. This "one China" principle is reaffirmed by the
General Committee of the General Assembly which in all its succes-
sive sessions since 1993 has decided not to include the question of
the so-called Taiwan's "representation" in the agenda of the General
Assembly.
All other inter-governmental organizations of which China is a
member State have followed the same one-China policy of the
United Nations.
4. Significance of the General Recognition Accorded to the PRC
Recognition is merely declaratory and does not in itself constitute
or create States. Recognition "does not bring into legal existence a
state which did not exist before," while "[a] state may exist without
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being recognized, and if it does exist in fact, then, whether or not it
has been formally recognized by other states, it has a right to be
treated by them as a state., 78 Nevertheless, recognition, particularly
non-recognition, of State or Government does have significant legal
consequences. The international community's recognition that there
is only one China, that the PRC Government is the sole legitimate
Government of China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China
involves two aspects of the same position: recognition of the PRC
and non-recognition of Taiwan or the so-called ROC.
On one hand, the international community actively recognizes
China as one State of which Taiwan is an integral territorial part, and
further recognizes the Government of the PRC as the central gov-
ernment of that State. On the other hand, the international commu-
nity's negative action toward Taiwan, namely their non-recognition
of or withdrawal of recognition from Taiwan, further indicates this
community's acknowledgment and acceptance of the fact that Tai-
wan is not a State but a part of China, and that the Taiwanese
authorities are not the government of China.
The ninth edition of Oppenheim's International Law properly
states some of the legal consequences of non-recognition:
Generally, a situation denied recognition, and the consequences directly
flowing from it, will be treated by non-recognizing states as without in-
ternational legal effect. Thus a non-recognized state will not be treated as
a state, nor its government as a government of the state; and since the
community or authority in question will thus not be treated as having the
status or capacities of a state or government in international law, its ca-
pacity to conclude treaties, or to send agents of a diplomatic character, or
to make official appointments of persons whose acts are to be regarded as
acts of a state may all be called in question. Generally, in its relations with
non-recognizing states that community will not benefit from those conse-
quences, which normally flow from the grant of recognition.'9
It is true that an entity that fulfils the criteria for statehood does
not disqualify as a State merely because of the lack of recognition by
78. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 138 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed.,
1963).
79. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Ar-
thur Watts eds., 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM].
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certain other States. However, recognition, particularly precipitate
recognition, does not necessarily turn into a State an entity that does
not satisfy all the essential conditions for statehood. Nevertheless,
one can not overlook the significance of recognition or non-
recognition. In the case of Taiwan, the province does not itself sat-
isfy the criteria for statehood and thus does not stand as a State. The
international community's one-China policy and its refusal to recog-
nize Taiwan as a State are highly declarative of the fact that Taiwan
is not a sovereign nation but a part of a sovereign nation - the State
of China legitimately represented by the PRC Government.
II. CRITERIA OF STATEHOOD AND THE STATUS
OF TAIWAN
One of the arguments supporting Taiwan's independence is that
the territory satisfies all the requirements of statehood and therefore
is already a sovereign nation. For example, Lung-chu Chen, a long-
time activist and proponent for Taiwan's independence, recently
wrote: "Judged by the international legal standard of statehood, Tai-
wan is a sovereign, independent state in every sense of the word. Ac-
cording to this standard, an independent state must have a permanent
population, control over a defined territory, and a government capa-
ble of governing effectively in internal processes and acting respon-
sibly in external relations. Taiwan has more than fulfilled all of these
requirements."8 Is this the case? Let us reexamine the criteria for
statehood in customary international law and determine whether
Taiwan really meets this criteria.
To qualify as a State, an entity must have its own people, its own
territory, its own government and freedom from any external de-
pendency or sovereignty. Simply stating, using the words of Oppen-
heim, "[a] state proper is in existence when a people is settled in a
territory under its own sovereign government."' According to the
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, a puta-
80. See Chen, supra note 57, at 678-79 (pointing out that the sovereignty of
Taiwan depends on its people).
81. OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, vol. 1, at 120 (defining the concept of the
state).
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tive State must meet at least four criteria: (1) A permanent popula-
tion; (2) a fixed territory; (3) a government; and (4) the capacity to
enter into relations with other nations.82 Although this Convention it-
self binds upon only States Parties, it "is commonly accepted as re-
flecting, in general terms, the requirements of statehood at customary
international law.,
83
It is important to emphasize from the outset that the criteria elabo-
rated in the Montevideo Convention should be viewed intra-actively
as a whole. These criteria, when correctly analyzed, "cannot be ap-
plied piecemeal"; rather, they "relate to and find definition in one
another. 8 4 Thus, "[a] putative state... must possess a government
that, itself, governs a population within a specified territory and that,
itself, has the capacity to enter into foreign relations.""
A. PERMANENT POPULATION
Some elastically construe the requirement for a permanent popu-
lation. Oppenheim defines a population or "people" as "an aggregate
of individuals who live together as a community, though they may
belong to different races or creeds or cultures, or be of different col-
our., 86 Under this construction, for the purpose of statehood, an en-
tity's population must first live together as one people, and secondly
must form a national community.87 Under another construction, the
permanent population requirement suggests that "there must be peo-
ple identifying themselves with the territory no matter how small or
82. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933 L.N.T.S. 19, U.S.T.S.
No. 881, 28 A.J.I.L. Supp. 75, art. 1 (1934).
83. See D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 102
(5th ed. 1998); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-34 (1979) (discussing the criteria for statehood); Nil
LANTE WALLACE-BRUCE, CLAIMS TO STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51
(1994) (defining the traditional concept of statehood).
84. See Omar M. Dajani, Stalled Between Seasons: The International Legal
Status of Palestine During the Interim Period, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 27,
82 (1997).
85. See id. at 82.
86. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, vol. 1, at 121 (providing a definition of
people for purposes of determining the extent of a fixed or permanent population).
87. See id. (requiring that a permanent population is one that identifies itself as
a single cohesive unit).
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large the population might be."8
The population in Taiwan may meet the permanent population
criterion under either construction. There are about 21 million per-
manent residents in the province of Taiwan. ' They live together as
part of the Chinese population and form a special local Chinese
community in the same way as in any other province on the Chinese
mainland. To the extent of habitual inhabitance, this local Chinese
population also identifies with Taiwan. They, therefore, constitute
the permanent population of the province.
Nevertheless, since ninety-seven percent of the "people" of Tai-
wan are ethnic han Chinese, they are no different from the permanent
population of any other province or political subdivision in the
mainland.90 They are all citizens of China covering the same geo-
graphical sphere, i.e., the Chinese mainland and the Taiwan Island.
The permanent population in Taiwan is simply part of the permanent
population of the entire State of China, regardless of the name used
to designate it.
B. DEFINED TERRITORY
In general, a putative State without a defined territory is impossi-
ble, for this territory is the necessary space in which the putative
State exercises its sovereign power."' Nevertheless, the requirement
of a "defined territory" for statehood has elastically been construed
so that the territory of a putative State does not need to meet or ex-
ceed a minimum size,92 nor does it need to be completely self-
88. See WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 83, at 53.
89. See (last visited May 2, 2000) <www.chinataiwan.org:Ichinataiwan'tour/
lying/1999081301t.htm> (stating that the size of the population in Taiwan was
21,470,000 in 1999).
90. See (last visited May 2, 2000) <wwwv.chinataiwan.org:Ichinataiwan/
tour/lying/1999081302t.htm> (noting that more than 98% of the population of
Taiwan are ethnic Han Chinese).
91. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, vol. 1, at 563-64 (noting that -[a] wander-
ing tribe, although it has a government and is otherwise organized, is not a state
until it has settled down in a territory of its own").
92. See id., at 563 (stating that "the necessary territory [of a State] may be very
small, as with the Vatican City, the Principality of Monaco, the Republic of San
Marino, the Principality of Liechtenstein or Nauru").
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coherent or to conform to any particular form.9" Further, although a
defined territory is generally required, perfect demarcation of the ter-
ritorial boundaries of a State or putative State is not. As was stated in
the following passage from a decision of 1929, the requirement of a
"defined territory" does not require precise delimitation of every
comer and every portion of a putative State's boundaries:
Whatever may be the importance of the delimitation of bounda-
ries, one cannot go so far as to maintain that as long as this delimita-
tion has not been legally effected, the state in question cannot be
considered as having any territory whatsoever... In order to say that
a state exists ... it is enough that this territory has a sufficient con-
sistency, even though its boundaries have not yet been accurately
delimited, and that the state actually exercises independent public
authority over that territory.94
China's territorial and boundary disputes with some of its neigh-
boring States do not make China a non-State."' For example, Albania
has unsettled border disputes with Serbia, but its statehood and ca-
pacity to participate in international organizations as a sovereign
State remained unaffected.96
Essentially the putative State must have a territory of its own over
which it exercises sovereign and independent authority.97 If the entire
territory under the custody of an entity is owned or claimed by an-
other entity, then whether the former entity can claim statehood be-
comes highly questionable because it is doubtful whether it indeed
93. See WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 83, at 38 (stating that a State, such as the
United States and Tanzania, may be comprised of non-contiguous territories).
94. See Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschafi v. Polish State, 5 A.D. No. 5,
14-15 (Polish-German Mix. Arb. Trib. 1929).
95. See MU YAPING, ET AL., supra note 50, at 265-271.
96. See Monastety of St. Naoum Case (Advisory Opinion), 1924 P.C.I.J., Ser.
B, No. 9, at 19 (recognizing Albania's international personality and capacity for
membership in the League of Nations despite its border dispute with Serbia); set,
also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (Feb. 20) (discuss-
ing the border disputes between Albania and Serbia and the extent to which territo-
rial disputes over sovereign territory did not affect Albania's ability engage in in-
ternational discussions and organizations).
97. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 36 (discussing the fundamental criteria
for statehood as requiring territorial sovereignty and the possession of territory).
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owns a territory." In other words, a self-owned and necessary terri-
tory is inseparable from the sovereign and independent operation of a
putative State. Using the words of Crawford of Cambridge, "the
State must consist of a certain coherent territory effectively governed
-a formula which demonstrates that the requirement of territory is
rather a constituent of government and independence than a separate
criterion of its own." 99
In the case of Taiwan, it is true that there does exist a defined land
territory consisting of the Taiwan Island per" se and a number of
smaller islands, including some just off the shore of the Chinese
mainland.' °° Yet, to claim statehood, an entity must own territory es-
sentially free from claims by any other entity.' U The territory of Tai-
wan is not owned, and therefore not disposable, by any entity other
than the State of China. Although the Taiwanese authorities are in
actual possession, custody, and control of the territory in question,
they do not have legal title to the territory and therefore do not pos-
sess the capacity and authority to legally sever such territory from
that of the Chinese mainland. 0 2
The Chinese territory in Taiwan may not become Taiwan's own
unless and until the Chinese Government in Beijing abandons its
sovereignty over Taiwan, which is unlikely to happen. Taiwan's
situation is no different from that of any other province of China.
The province of Hainan, e.g., administers the territory of Hainan Is-
land on behalf of the central Government.'"" This territory, however,
98. See id. at 36-37 (arguing that continuous territorial disputes and the lack of
a defined territory creates questions as to whether or not a State exists due to the
lack of ownership of a fixed territory).
99. See id. at 40.
100. See CIHAI, supra note 5, at 477.
101. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 37-38 (arguing that statehood funda-
mentally requires that is free from claims, especially when there are conflicting
claims over the entire territory as opposed to only a portion, since this is a re-
quirement for admission to the United Nations as a sovereign entity).
102. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement
that an entity must have a territory of its own).
103. Hainan is the second largest island of China. It was a special administrative
region under Guangdong Province until 1988 when it was upgraded to the status of
province. See (last visited May 2, 2000) <www.hainan-window.com.cn/word.htm>
(noting the establishment of Hainan Province in 1988).
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is not Hainan's own. Because China owns the island as a whole,
Hainan does not meet the criterion of a "defined territory" for the
purpose of claiming statehood and neither does Taiwan.
In other words, the fact that Taiwan does not own a territory of its
own and does not possess ultimate sovereign and independent
authority over such a territory constitutes a legal impediment to its
claims to statehood.' 4 While the Taiwanese authorities hold signifi-
cant municipal authority over areas under its control, they do not
possess sovereignty over them in any legal or even practical sense. 0 5
It is China as a whole that retains sovereignty over Taiwan. Neither
the Kuomintang nor DPP authorities, nor any other political organi-
zation, may change the status of the territory of Taiwan as part of the
territory of the entire State of China without consent from the Chi-
nese central Government. 106
Accordingly, Taiwan does not have a territory of its own and fails
to meet the "defined territory" requirement. Therefore, the Taiwan-
ese authorities do not exercise sovereign and independent authority
over any territory of their own at all. Rather, they are merely admin-
istering a part of China's territory on behalf of the State of China or
the Chinese central Government.
C. GOVERNMENT
A government is an indispensable requirement for statehood.'"7
The question arises as to what kind of government is required. For
the purpose of statehood, the government criterion does not require
that an entity conform to a particular form of government.' " The
family of nations comprises States with various forms of government
with different degrees and forms of democracy, from republics to
104. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement
that an entity must have a territory of its own).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107, See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 42 (stating the proposition that to be a
State, one must have an effective government).
108. See id. at 42-43 (arguing that although a form of government is a require-
ment for statehood, the type of government itself is not prescribed in order for
other countries to recognize the State as a sovereign entity).
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monarchies to theocracies.' 9 The form of government and its degree
of democracy do not matter. A government constituted by way of
popular election does not make it more a government. Similarly, a
government constituted not by general election, or a government
lacking any element of democracy, does not make it less a govern-
ment as long as it exercises effective public authority and sover-
eignty.110
Further, when we discuss government in the context of criteria for
statehood, we do not mean any type or any level of organizations of
public authorities. A local government, for example, does not meet
the criterion of a government for the purpose of statehood because it
does not have the necessary legal credentials and capacity to claim
statehood for the community it administers."' Therefore, what mat-
ters are effectiveness and legitimacy. The degree of actual authority
exercised measures effectiveness, while legal title to exercise that
authority measures legitimacy."" In other words, what is essential for
statehood in this connection is a stable central political organization
that exercises effective public power within a defined territory and
over a permanent population, acts as the executive organ responsible
for the external relations of the State and is not subject to the sover-
eignty of any other authority."' As Crawford points out, "[t]he point
about 'government' is that it has two aspects: the actual exercise of
authority, and the right or title to exercise that authority".'
A government's actual exercise of authority, or its effectiveness,
109. See id. at 43 (providing a list of the variety of governments that exist in the
world and how and when they were recognized throughout history).
110. See id. at 44 (arguing that the form of selection of a government does not
govern whether or not others States recognize it, the factor is whether it has
authority to act on behalf of the sovereign territory).
111. See id. at 47 (stating that although the existence of a government is a re-
quirement for statehood, the capacity to claim statehood also hinges on other fac-
tors such as the capacity to enter into relations with other states, which is why local
territories and governments do not have the authority to claim statehood).
112. See CRAWVFORD, supra note 83, at 42 (stating that the fundamental require-
ments of legitimacy and effectiveness hinge on the combination and extent to
which the state has the authority to act on behalf of the state).
113. See id. at 48 (listing the requirements for the exercise of authority as well
as the other requirements that enables recognition of a sovereign state).
114. See id. at 44.
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refers to its structural coherence and its general capacity to maintain
law and order within an area it controls or purports to control."'
There is little development, however, regarding the degree and stan-
dards of effectiveness. Some special situations admitted exceptions.
Harris, for example, notes:
State practice suggests that the requirement of a "stable political organi-
zation" in control of the territory does not apply during a civil war in a
state that already exists (e.g. the Lebanese Civil War 1975-1990). A State
that currently has problems of effective government is Somalia. Since
guerrillas overthrew President Barre's Government in 1991, fighting has
persisted between rival clan-based militias with different territorial bases.
A separate state of Somaliland declared its independence in the north west
of Somalia in 1991, but has not gained international recognition. The Dji-
bouti Conference of interested states and parties led to the establishment
of an interim Government, but this does not have effective control of
Mogadishu, the capital, or the country at large. UN forces were sent into
Somalia between 1992 and 1995, but failed to bring the situation under
control. Despite these problems, Somalia remains a UN member and con-
tinues to be recognized as a state by the international community."6
Legal title, or legitimacy, refers to the government's exclusive
sovereign and legal right to govern a territory under international
law.' 7 It is possible that this territory came into acquisition by way of
occupation, prescription, succession, or cession by the former sover-
eign of the territory."8 However, where applicable, one can obtain
territory in accordance with the principle of self-determination.
Therefore, the government criterion possesses both factual and legal
dimensions.
It is also noteworthy that to a certain degree, the elements of ef-
fectiveness and legal title can complement one another. A solid legal
115. See id. at 46 (describing the exercise of authority as one which requires
control over the territory).
116. HARRIS, supra note 83, at 104.
117. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 77 (discussing the traditional criteria for
statehood which includes the authority to govern effectively a particular sovereign
territory).
118. See id. (describing various forms of territorial acquisition leading to gov-
ernance and recognition as States, including Rhodeshia, Formosa, and Guinea-
Bissau).
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title can make up for a lack of actual exercise of authority." ' Simi-
larly, a weak and fragile legal title would require a higher degree of
effectiveness.' 20 This inverse and complementary relationship be-
tween effectiveness and legal title provides an explanation why the
Belgian Congo, now Zaire, was accorded precipitate recognition in
1960 when its new government "was bankrupt, divided, and in prac-
tice hardly able to control even the capital".'2' Conversely, the lack of
legal title on the part of the government of Rhodesia, which assumed
power in violation of the principle of self-determination, to govern
the territory in question resulted in almost universal non-recognition
of the regime as a State or government, even if it maintained effec-
tive control over the territory at the time. '2
Judging the situation in Taiwan against the above criterion, one
may fail to see the Taiwanese authorities as a government for the
purpose of claiming statehood. It is true that the Kuomintang or DPP
authorities function as a de facto public administration in Taiwan,
and in that sense a "government," but it is no more than a special lo-
cal government, for it is not a central political organ that satisfies
both the elements of effectiveness and legal title.'2' Although the
Kuomintang or DPP regime's administration of Taiwan has been
generally effective and stable, it does not have the required "legal ti-
tle" to pose itself as a government for statehood.'2' Instead, the Chi-
nese Government in Beijing is the sole legitimate Government with
legal title to represent and govern the entire Chinese territory, in-
cluding Taiwan. The Taiwanese authorities do not even possess the
weakest and most fragile legal title to the territory of Taiwan. Thus,
119. See id. at 79, 83 (arguing that if a nation has a treaty or other form of for-
mal recognition of its sovereign authority, then the ability to actually exercise it
does not diminish its recognition as a state).
120. See KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 102 (Gen~ve Libr. Droz. 1968) (stating a counter-argument
that if an entity only has a weak hold on legal title, States require a greater amount
of exercise of actual authority to warrant recognizing it as a sovereign entity).
121. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 43-44.
122. See John Dugard, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 97-98 (Cam-
bridge, Grotius 1987).
123. See supra notes 111-122 and accompanying text (discussing the elements
of effectiveness and legal title).
124. See id.
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no matter how strong and how effective their de facto exercise of
authority over the territory may be in the meantime, their total lack
of legitimacy determines that they do not meet the government crite-
rion for statehood.
D. CAPACITY TO ENTER INTO FOREIGN RELATIONS
The fourth requirement for statehood, the capacity to enter into
foreign relations, refers to the legal capacity or legal competence of
an entity to participate in public international relations, including the
legal competence to discharge its international obligations."'2 This le-
gal capacity relates very little with economic or monetary ability or
political or military power. Some developing States lack the eco-
nomic capacity to engage in active relations with other nations, they
are nevertheless States and recognized as such.'26 California, on the
other hand, possesses more than abundant economic power to fully
participate in the international system, yet it is not and cannot be rec-
ognized as a State in the sense of international law, because it does
not possess the legal competence to act as a State on the international
plane. 27
Indeed, the capacity to enter into foreign relations necessarily em-
bodies the element of "sovereignty" or "independence", which de-
termines whether an entity has or has not the legal competence to
participate in international relations and to effect the undertakings
into which it enters on behalf of the population and territory it gov-
128erns.
Judge Anzilotti stated the significance of sovereignty or independ-
125. See WALLACE-BRUCE, supra note 83, at 55-6 (discussing the fact that in
addition to owning territory, having a valid government, a state must also have the
authority to act for its territory in foreign relations, then only can it be a State).
126. See id. at 72-3 (citing examples of such nations as Serbia and Albania who
have meager economic capacity, yet many nations still recognize these as sover-
eign entities and acknowledge their ability to engage in foreign relations with other
nations).
127. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 48-9 (stating that in addition to the abil-
ity to exercise in foreign relations, a sovereign state must also have the ability to
act independently and of its own accord).
128. See id. at 48-9 (discussing in general the requirements for international rec-
ognition as a state including the ability and authority to commit its population to
international undertakings).
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ence to statehood in his opinion in the Austro-German Customs Un-
ion Case:
[T]he independence of Austria within the meaning of Article 88 is noth-
ing else but the existence of Austria, within the frontiers laid down by the
Treaty of Saint Germain, as a separate state not subject to the authority of
any other State or group of States. Independence as thus understood is
really no more than the normal condition of States according to interna-
tional law; it may also be described as sovereignty (suprenma potestas), or
external sovereignty [italics original], by which is meant that the State has
over it no authority other than that of international law.
The conception of independence, regarded as the normal characteristic of
States as subjects of international law, cannot be better defined than by
comparing it with the exceptional and, to some extent, abnormal class of
States known as "dependent States"....
[T]he legal conception of independence has nothing to do with a State's
subordination to international law or with the numerous and constantly
increasing states of de facto dependence which characterise the relation of
one country to other countries.
[T]he restrictions upon a State's liberty, whether arising out of ordinary
international law or contractual engagements, do not as such in the least
affect its independence. As long as these restrictions do not place the State
under the legal authority of another State, the former remains an inde-
pendent State however extensive and burdensome those obligations may
be.
129
Some commentators even identify the element of sovereignty or
independence with the capacity requirement. As is stated in the Ninth
Edition of Oppenhein 's International Law, for example,
There must... be a sovereign government. Sovereignty is supreme
authority, which on the international plane means.., legal authority
which is not in law dependent on any other earthly authority. Sovereignty
in the strict and narrowest sense of the term implies, therefore, independ-
ence all round, within and without the borders of the country [emphasis in
129. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 51 (quoting the Austro-German Customs
Union Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 41, 1931, at 57 (separate opinion of Anzilotti,
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original].13
Harris has also made it clear by stating that:
When the Montevideo Convention refers to "capacity to enter into rela-
tions with other states" as a requirement of statehood it is referring to in-
dependence as that term is understood in Judge Anzilotti's [separate]
opinion [in the Austro-German Customs Union Case], i.e., independence
in law from the authority of any other state (and hence the capacity under
its national law to conduct relations with other states).
1 3
1
Crawford similarly recognizes the importance of this independ-
ence element by stating that "each State is an original foundation
predicated on a certain basic independence. This was represented in
the Montevideo formula by 'capacity to enter into relations with
other States."
32
It therefore follows that, in arguing that a State must have the legal
competence to engage in international relations, we necessarily mean
that it must be both separate and sovereign. In other words, the State
must possess a legal identity that is distinct from any other State's
and subordinate to nothing but international law. The legal capacity
or competence, writes Crawford, "depends partly on the power of
internal government of a territory, without which international obli-
gations may not be carried into effect, and partly on the entity con-
cerned being separate for the purpose of such relations so that no
other entity carries out and accepts responsibility for them".'3
The very concept of international law requires that a State be sepa-
rate from any other State. According to Marek, "international law...
is a legal order governing relations between independent States, that
is to say, between separate and distinct entities," and that is why in-
dependence functions as a criterion of statehood.' 4 In addition, an
entity purporting to act as a State must be sovereign and not subject
to any authority but that of international law to which it has con-
130. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, vol. 1, at 122.
131. See HARRIS, supra note 83, at 106-07.
132. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 47.
133. See id. at 51-52.
134. See MAREK, supra note 120, at 162-63.
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sented or accepted."' Only if such an entity satisfies the element of
sovereignty can it possess the legal capacity to act as a State on the
international plane.
Judge Huber was right when he stated in the Island of Palmas ar-
bitration case: "Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies
independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the func-
tions of a state."' 36 The element of sovereignty or independence is so
essential for statehood that the capacity of an entity to enter into for-
eign relations is actually contingent upon the degree of such sover-
eignty or independence. 3 7 Since sovereignty or independence as an
essential requirement for statehood is exclusive, an entity cannot be
said to meet the capacity criterion for statehood if it is in fact and/or
in law subordinate to another State's sovereignty or legal order even
if it satisfies all other criteria. "'
Among all criteria, the sovereignty element is undoubtedly the
most important and most essential requirement for statehood, and is
also the one that has been gravely misconstrued in the case of Tai-
wan. The assertion that the regime in Taiwan acted "responsibly in
external relations"139 is nowhere near the sovereignty requirement. A
local government is to some degree considered able to "act responsi-
bly in external relations."' ' For example, when Kunming of Yunnan
Province and Denver of Colorado became sister cities, the mayors of
both cities acted "responsibly in their external relations."" In main-
135. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 52 (stating that to be a State, one must
have the independence to direct its own actions subject only to the international
law that it accepted).
136. See id. at 48 (quoting the Island of Pahnas Arbitration, 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838
(Huber, J.)).
137. See id. (stating that the ability to enter into international agreements which
bind the territory is a fundamental requirement of sovereignty and statehood).
138. See id. at 48-49 (arguing that if a state is subject to the sovereignty of an-
other entity, then it is incapable of entering into independent foreign relations, and
thereby cannot meet the criteria for statehood).
139. See Chen supra note 57, at 679.
140. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 148-49 (interpreting the ability to engage
in external relations to include the actions of local governments to a certain degree,
although not arising to full-fledged statehood from an international perspective).
141. In his welcoming speech at a luncheon in honor of visiting Chinese Premier
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taining and advancing this relationship, they continue to act respon-
sibly on the international plane by, e.g., entering into and honoring
various agreements for cultural and other exchanges.142 The ability to
act, however, does not render Kunming or Denver capable of inde-
pendently entering into foreign relations.
To a certain degree, the special local authorities in Taiwan may
also enter into and maintain "external relations" and act responsibly
in such relations.' 43 Yet, these relations are not State-to-State rela-
tions for a simple reason: A political subdivision or a local govern-
ment, no matter how special it may be, does not have the sovereignty
and independence to act as a State." In other words, a non-sovereign
and non-independent entity, no matter what it purports to be, does
not have the necessary legal competence and qualifications to enter
into relations with other nations on a State-to-State basis.
4
1
Although politically separated from the Chinese mainland for
slightly more than fifty years,'4 6 Taiwan remains under the sover-
Zhu Rongji, Mayor Wellington Webb of Denver stated that "Denver has built a
sister-city relationship with China's Kunming City", believing that "Premier Zhu
Rongji's visit will further promote friendly cooperation between Denver and
China". Xinhua Reports on Zhu Rongli Visit to Denver, World News Connection,
Apr. 11, 1999, available at WESTLAW 1999 WL 14780360. For a list of Sino-US
sister cities (including the Denver-Kunming relationship), see <http://sister-
cities.wego.com>.
142. See id.
143. Taiwan currently maintains trade and other non-diplomatic relations with
most countries of the world maintaining diplomatic relations with the PRC Gov-
ernment. China "has not objected to non-governmental economic or cultural ex-
changes between Taiwan and foreign countries" within the ambit of one China. See
White Paper, supra note 7, at V.
144. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 146-51 (demonstrating that local gov-
ernments regardless of its economic capacity and authority, does not have the in-
ternational recognition sufficient to enable it to engage in relations with other sov-
ereign entities and other States will not recognize its exercise of international
power).
145. See id. at 146-51 (repeating his premise that local governments do not have
the authority to engage in foreign relations and therefore other sovereign states will
not recognize the entity as a sovereign entity).
146. Since the Nationalists' retreat from the mainland in 1949, Taiwan has been
under the administration and control of one fraction of the political forces of
China, namely, the KMT and now the DPP. By "politically separated", I mean that
the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan are separately administered by different political
forces of the same country that is still technically in a state of civil war. The fact
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eignty of China.' 7 Even though Taiwan may arguably satisfy the re-
quirement of separateness in the sense that it is maintaining a sepa-
rate legal order different from that of the mainland, it clearly does
not fulfil the requirement of sovereignty.' The persistent position of
China throughout history is that Taiwan is an inalienable part of
China. 149 It was also the official position of the Taiwanese authorities
since 1949 and at least until the 1990s. The international community
recognizes this fact, in addition to the fact that the Government of the
People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate Government of
China in its entirety.
Thus, it is only the PRC Government that holds sovereignty over
Taiwan and therefore the legal competence to enter into relations
with other nations on behalf of the entire State of China, including
Taiwan. Just as the Hong Kong SAR ("HKSAR")"' Government is
governing Hong Kong on behalf of China, the Taiwanese authorities
are at most exercising defacto administrative control over Taiwan as
a special local government on behalf of China, not on behalf of
themselves. Again, the reason is quite simple: the sovereignty over
these territories is vested in China as a whole, not in the respective
territory or local government itself.
In view of the above, it would be impossible to characterize Tai-
that a country is internally divided into two parts under separate political forces
does not in itself change the nature and scope of sovereignty of the country as a
whole.
147. See CRAWVFORD, supra note 83, at 146-51.
148. See supra notes 132-138 and accompanying text (discussing the necessary
elements of separateness and sovereignty). Taiwan is merely internally and tempo-
rarily separate from the rest of China. It is not internationalli' distinct from the
Chinese Mainland and has never been granted a status that gives it the legal com-
petence to enter into inter-governmental relations with other nations. Thus, Taiwan
is not sovereign even if it may be to some extent separate.
149. See White Paper, supra note 7.
150. HKSAR stands for "Hong Kong Special Administrative Region", a special
political subdivision of China's under the Hong Kong Basic Law. See Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1511 (1990).
151. See CRA\VFORD, supra note 83, at 51 (describing the difference between the
authority of a local government and a sovereign national government and the ex-
tent to which a national government has greater authority to act on behalf of its
peoples than a local authority).
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wan or the Taiwanese authorities as an independent and sovereign
entity. While Taiwan under the Kuomintang or DPP authorities is
leading a somewhat distinct life separate from the rest of China, it
does not possess the legal authority over the province in international
relations.
III. SELF-DETERMINATION AND TAIWAN
The principle of self-determination, like many other principles and
concepts of international law, has been misleadingly and irresponsi-
bly construed and abused by politicians and scholars. One of such
misconstructions or abuses arises in its improper application to Tai-
wan. Some suggest, for example:
We need a new international norm of self-determination to fit the Tai-
wan/China model. It would read something like this: "If the majority (or
we might demand a higher percentage) of the adult population of a geo-
graphic area expresses its wish, for any reason, to separate from the terri-
torial unit of which it is currently a part, it has the right to do so." A modi-
fied version of this right, and one that would also fit the Taiwan/China
situation, would read: "If the majority of the adult population of a geo-
graphic area expresses its wish to separate from the territorial unit of
which it is currently a part because the government of the territorial unit
does not represent the whole people, it has the right to do so.
''
5
Notwithstanding, the author of the above passage is honest about
the status of the principle of self-determination. The foregoing author
acknowledges that what she proposes, if accepted, is going to be "a
new" version of the principle and, therefore, before its adoption, is a
non-existing legal "principle" as a matter of positive law. In other
words, her formula is at most lexferenda. It does not reflect the lex
lata of the norm at all.
What is the lex lata of the norm? Who is and can be the "self'?
What "determination" can be made under what circumstances? Does
the principle of self-determination apply to any territorial unit of an
existing State? If so, in what contexts? Where the principle does ap-
ply, does it include the right to secede unilaterally from the parent
State? In addressing the above issues, this section illustrates why the
152. See Valerie Epps, Self-Determination in the Taiwan/China Context, 32
NEW ENG. L. REV. 685, 692 (1998) (emphasis added).
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principle of self-determination does not apply to Taiwan, and why
Taiwan does not have the right to unilaterally secede from China un-
der existing international law.
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
1. Doctrinal Origins
Compared with the lasting notions of sovereignty and territorial
integrity, self-determination is a relatively young concept in the body
of international law.'53 The doctrinal origins of self-determination go
back in history to the first Soviet leader, Vladmir Ilich Lenin, and
President Woodrow Wilson. With regard to Lenin's observations on
self-determination:
Lenin envisioned a right of the Russian Empire minorities to secede. Al-
though Lenin did not favor secession, he considered the right to secede a
prerequisite to a free and voluntary association among nationalities, dis-
tinct from the tsarist "prison of nations." Accordingly, the Soviet multi-
national association was based upon an agreement among equal part-
ners-a treaty that Lenin considered characteristic of a federation. Lenin
believed that only a treaty embodying the sovereign will of all nationali-
ties could reconcile self-determination with the transfer of power to a
higher entity.1
4
Wilson also espoused the principle of self-determination by advo-
cating that "every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under
which they shall live"."' Wilson's vision of self-determination, how-
ever, was different from Lenin's. Wilson proposed an idea focusing
on the freedom of the people to choose their sovereign, thereby envi-
sioning an ideal of internal self-determination, whereas Lenin advo-
cated a secessionary nature of self-determination "as a means to lib-
153. See CRAWFORD, supra note 83, at 85 (arguing that the principle of self-
determination is a new concept when compared to other concepts of statehood).
154. See Urs W. Saxer, The Transfornation of the Soviet Union: From a So-
cialist Federation to a Commonwealth of hIdependent States, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 581, 607.
155. See James E. Falkowski, Secessionar " SelfDeterminnation: A Jeffersonian
Perspective, 9 B.U. INT'L L. J. 209, 219 (1991) (quoting Michla Pomerance, The
United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conceptton,
70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,2 (1976)).
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crate people from exploitative bourgeois governments in pursuit of
socialist realization."'
5 6
Nevertheless, whether under Lenin's or Wilson's espousal, self-
determination was little more than a political principle throughout
the post-First World War era. Self-determination as we know it today
did not become a principle of international law until after the Second
World War.'57
2. Self-Determination in the Decolonization Process
The principle of self-determination of peoples has given birth to a
multitude of newly independent States. 5' It has in particular served
the decolonization process largely generated by the two World Wars.
However, the decolonization process, with which the principle of
self-determination is closely associated, has had a history of more
than two centuries. In a sense, the attainment of independence by the
United States from British rule in 1776 may have started the global
process of decolonization. 9 As fruits of this process, major Spanish
and Portuguese colonies in central and south America became inde-
pendent nations in the 19th century: Colombia in 1800, Paraguay and
Venezuela in 1811, Argentina in 1816, Chile in 1818, Mexico and
Peru in 1821, Brazil in 1822, Uruguay in 1825, and so on.'6" In Af-
rica, Ethiopia was a pioneer in the decolonization process by attain-
ing its independence from Italian colonial rule in 1896 and, after a
period of Italian reoccupation, reestablishing itself as a sovereign
156. See Michael J. Kelley, Political Downsizing-Re-Emergence of Self-
Determination and the Movement Toward Smaller States, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 20,
214-215 (1999) (citing ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 21-
22 (1995)).
157. See CRAWFORD, supra note, 83 at 85-86 (setting forth the historical devel-
opment of self-determination and its development following World War II).
158. See Sam Blay, Self-Determination: A Reassessment in the Post-Communist
Era, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 275, 277 (1994) (listing the new states devel-
oping as a result of self-determination including newly independent states, the di-
vision of Czechoslovakia into two countries and the division of Yugoslavia into
multiple states).
159. See Falkowski, supra note 155, at 213 (explaining that American independ-
ence and the Declaration of Independence was a form of self-determination).
160. See SHIJIE DITU CE, supra note 70, at 47 (Mexico), 49 (Colombia), 50
(Venezuela), 51 (Paraguay & Peru), & 52 (Argentina, Brazil, Chili & Uruguay).
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empire at the end of the Second World War.''
Self-determination, on the other hand, did not enter the realm of
international law until the late 1900s and the early part of the twenti-
eth century.' 62 The first major self-determination movement took
place after the Allied victory in the First World War, when defeated
empires were forcibly broken up in order to create new nation-
States.'63 The breakup of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the inde-
pendence of new sovereigns such as Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon,
Palestine and Saudi Arabia.' 6" The Austro-Hungarian Empire dis-
solved into Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Austria.'
Poland reemerged as a sovereign nation from portions of Germany,
Austro-Hungary and Czarist Russia. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and
Finland declared independence from the Czar.'6
The most dramatic wave of self-determination and decolonization
came after World War II, resulting in independence from major
European colonial powers of new nation-States in virtually every
part of the world. Most notably, newly independent States appeared
on the political maps of Asia and Africa in quick succession."6' It is
noteworthy that the boundaries of many of these newly independent
States had been artificially created under colonial rule, with the result
that many such States contained significant ethnic minorities.'
161. See id. at 34.
162. See Falkowski, supra note 155, at 220 (providing a history of the develop-
ment of self-determination from just prior to World War I to the mid-20th century).
163. See id. at 220 (stating that in the post World War I period, the defeat of
numerous colonial empires resulted in the formation of several states).
164. See id. (describing the breakup of the vast Ottoman empire and listing the
nations which resulted from the dissolution).
165. See 1 THE NEW BOOK OF KNOWLEDGE 524-525 (Grolier Inc., 1999); J.A.S.
GRENVILLE, HISTORY OF THE WORLD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 129-130 (The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1994).
166. See GRENVILLE, supra note 165, at 128-29.
167. See Blay, supra note 158, at 277(discussing the reformation of several Af-
rican and Asian empires right after World War II as a result of decolonization).
168. See id. at 276 (noting that as a result of decolonization, African nationalists
disregarded ethnic boundaries and created national borders using the colonial bor-
ders which did not account for different ethnic groups).
2000]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
3. Use/Misuse of Self-Determination in Non-colonial Contexts
Since the decolonization process is essentially complete, the prin-
ciple of self-determination is increasingly used, and often abused, as
a tool by sub-groups within States to demonstrate their continued
existence as diverse and uniquely different cultures. In the interna-
tional community consisting of some 200 sovereign States, there are
some 3,000 different linguistic groups and 5,000 distinct ethnic mi-
norities.,9
Particularly in the post-Cold War era, ethnic, linguistic, religious,
or cultural groups within nations reemerge demanding devolution or
secession in pursuit of limited or full sovereignty. 70 Examples of
such groups invoking self-determination include the dissolution of
the former Yugoslavia, the plight of the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and
Iran, the demands of the Basques in Spain, and those of the Quebe-
cois in Canada.1 71 Self-determination was "proclaimed by, and on be-
half of, non-state populations as diverse as the Kurds, the Quebecois,
the Basques, the Scots, the Palestinians, the East Timorese, and the
Tamis.
,,17
Later this section discusses the impropriety of extending the prin-
ciple of self-determination to minority groups, territorial units or
identity communities within an existing nation-State.
B. MEANING OF SELF-DETERMINATION
1. The UN Charter
The incorporation of self-determination in the Charter of the
United Nations serves as a cornerstone for its establishment as a le-
169. See Daniel Therer, National Minorities: A Global, European. and Swviss
Perspective, 19 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 53 (Winter/Spring 1995).
170. See Hurst Hannum, The Specter of Secession: Responding to Claims f"or
Ethnic Self-Determination, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 13 [hereinafter lan-
num] (summarizing the insurgence of independent states along the lines of relig-
ion, culture, and/or ethnicity).
171. See id. at 14 (listing the number of ethnic groups that wish for separate
states but resulted in only internal self-determination within a formally recognized
State).
172. See Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in
the Post-Colonial Age, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 259 (1996).
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gal principle. Under the Charter, one of the purposes of the United
Nations is "[tlo develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples."17' Here, the Charter refers to the "equal rights and self-
determination of peoples" in the context of "relations among na-
tions," implying that nationhood is a precondition for statehood.
Article 55 of the UN Charter, building upon Article 1, states that
"peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle" of self-determination are to be developed." 4 Chapters
XI, XII and XIII of the Charter regarding the disposition of non-self-
governing territories and the trusteeship system may be said to have
implicitly put the principle of self-determination into practice in the
trusteeship and colonial context.'7 Unfortunately, the Charter offers
no definition of self-determination, nations and peoples.
2. The Decolonization Declaration
The intention of States in regard to self-determination became
clearer when the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 1514 (XV)'76 containing the Declaration on the Granting of In-
dependence to Colonial Territories and Peoples in 1960 ("Decoloni-
zation Declaration"). Under the Declaration, "All peoples have the
right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely deter-
mine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development."'
7
The Decolonization Declaration further calls for the taking of im-
mediate steps "to transfer all powers to the peoples of [Trust and
Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have
not yet attained independence]... in accordance with their freely
173. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
174. See id. art. 55 (emphasis added).
175. See M.C. Baussiouni, Self-Determzination' and the Palestinians, 65 A\1.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 31, 32 (1971) (stating that these Chapters embody the prin-
ciple of self-determination "in spirit").
176. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960). [hereinafter Decolonization Declaration].
177. See id. (emphasis added).
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expressed will and desire.', 78 Yet, like the UN Charter, the Decoloni-
zation Declaration fails to define the se/f of self-determination and
the term "peoples."
3. The International Law Principles Declaration
The Decolonization Declaration is supplemented by General As-
sembly Resolution 1541 (XV), 79 Resolution 2621 (XXV) embodying
the 1970 Programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the
[1960] Declaration,'" and more importantly Resolution 2625 (XXV)
containing the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
("1970 Declaration" or "International Law Principles Declara-
tion").''
The 1970 Declaration reaffirms the principle of self-determination
as a right, providing that "[b]y virtue of the principle of... self-
determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter, all peoples have
the right freely to determine, without external interference, their po-
litical status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural devel-
opment."'
8 2
The International Law Principles Declaration further articulates
the right to self-determination as belonging to "peoples" by pro-
claiming that "[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent
State, the free association or integration with an independent State or
the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a
people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
178. See id. para. 5.
179. See Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or
Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called For Under Article 73e
of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1960).
180. See Programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
2621, U.N. G.A.O.R., 25th Sess., Supp. No.28, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/8086 (1970).
181. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. G.A.O.R., 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter International
Law Principles Declaration].
182. See id. at 124.
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determination by that people."'8 3 However, the General Assembly,
again, did not define "peoples" in the 1970 Declaration.
Furthermore, The failure of the Charter to define the term nation
and the General Assembly likewise neglecting to qualify the term
"peoples" ultimately created a definitional vacuum regarding the self
of self-determination. Nevertheless, the 1970 Declaration makes it
clear not to construe it as "authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States."' It further warns against
"any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and territorial integrity of any... State or country."'' The De-
colonization Declaration contained provisions to the same effect.'
Therefore self-determination does not intentionally serve as, nor is it
accepted as, an unqualified right of all "peoples" and identity com-
munities. This section elaborates more on this topic later. "'
4. International Human Rights Ins truments
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights begins in
its operative part by providing that "[a]ll peoples have the right of
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."'88 The Covenant similarly contains no definition of
"peoples." It is helpful, however, to take into account the following
provision which serves, to some extent, to illustrate what types of
"peoples" and communities are entitled to self-determination: "The
States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having re-
sponsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-




186. See Decolonization Declaration, supra note 176, para. 66.
187. See infi-a text accompanying notes 201-206 (discussing minority rights and
the disadvantages of unqualified self-determination).
188. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Civil Rights Covenant].
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provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."' 89 The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains identical
provisions in Article 1 .'9
In was 1966 that these two human rights covenants were adopted
at the General Assembly, and their timing, like that of the UN Char-
ter and the 1960 and 1970 declarations, should be taken into special
account. The mid-1940s marked the beginning of large-scale national
liberation and decolonization movements. The 1960s and 1970s were
the most important decades in the global decolonization process. As
many "peoples" in colonial territories and other non-self-governing
territories were demanding or struggling for independence, it was
natural, and indeed highly desirable, for the drafters and contracting
parties to include in the covenants the principle of self-determination
as embodied in the UN Charter.
The historical background of the covenants, together with the il-
lustrative paragraph concerning the obligation to promote and respect
self-determination by non-self-governing territories, suggests that
self-determination is not a human right for any individual or for any
particular group of people. Rather, it denotes a collective human
right of "peoples" of colonial territories, trust territories and other
non-self-governing territories that were separate and distinct from
but subordinate to their metropolitan or administering States.
5. Forms of Self-Determination and Sovereignty
Self-determination does not require any particular form of gov-
ernment and politics. A former trust territory, for example, might
well achieve independence by exercising the right of self-
determination, not necessarily through plebiscite, but through the ac-
tions and proclamations of local political leaders or organizations
that could speak on behalf of the territory or its population.
Indeed, self-determination has nothing to do with the degree and
form of democracy. Where a "people" is entitled to self-
determination, that people, through plebiscite, popular representation
189. See id. art. 1(3).
190. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6136
(1967), art. 1.
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or even dictatorship, may choose its own form of government free of
any external interference. This freedom of choice is in reference to
other States. The "people" exercising the right to self-determination
is free to determine its own form of government vis-6-vis all other
members of the international community. It may choose a "people's
republic," a republic, a federation, or a monarchy. The former ad-
ministering State or any other State may not dictate to such "people"
on what to do in that regard.
Internally speaking, however, whether the members of such "peo-
ple", vis-c-vis the 6lite or ruling class, have the right to choose or
change a particular form of government is not a matter of interna-
tional law. More specifically, the international law principle of self-
determination does not necessarily entitle any particular class or
members of a "people" to decide on their form of government as of
right. It is a matter of internal affairs of the people concerned to de-
termine how to exercise their right to self-determination and to de-
termine who decides what form of government to adopt. One could
hardly conclude that simply because Ethiopia re-emerged from colo-
nial occupation as an empire in 1896 and again after the World War
II its self-determination was invalid.
The same is true in the case of nation-States when they exercise
their sovereign and independent rights not in the context of self-
determination. As a corollary of sovereignty and independence, a
State has similar freedom of choice in selecting its political, social,
cultural and legal system vis-d-vis other States. It is not, however, the
concern of international law to determine how, by, or through whom
that freedom of choice is exercised. In other words, international law
neither supports nor forbids any particular form of government ex-
cept where specifically provided for; however, there are rules con-
cerning minority representation and prohibition of apartheid and ra-
cial and gender-based discrimination.
An internal revolution may well take place, overthrowing an ex-
isting regime in a State without violating international law, but this
does not mean that the populace of a State possesses a right to revo-
lution or a right to overturn a regime under international law.
Whether to be a monarchy or a republic, what degree or what kind of
democracy to adopt, and how to constitute its government, are es-
sentially matters of a State's domestic affairs in which no external
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interference is permissible under the principles of sovereign equality
and non-intervention.
C. SELF-DETERMINATION AND UNILATERAL SECESSION
International law recognizes no "right to self-determination" for
the purpose of unilateral secession from an existing sovereign nation-
State. Rather, the legality and likelihood of success of an independ-
ence movement is mainly determined by (1) the constitution and do-
mestic law of the existing State, (2) negotiations and agreements
between the central authorities of the existing State and the fractions
seeking independence, and/or ultimately (3) the attitude of the exist-
ing State. Foreign interventions in the form of precipitate recogni-
tion, which are not permissible under international law, or foreign
withholding of recognition, may also affect the outcome of an inde-
pendence movement, although the influence of the attitude of other
nations may be limited.
In any event, an independence movement within the existing bor-
ders of a State, whether successful or likely to succeed, is not a mat-
ter of self-determination as of right under international law. If inter-
national law is relevant at all, it is most important to meet the criteria
for statehood, a subject discussed above.
1. Constitutional Secession
The constitution or domestic law of an existing State, particularly
one with a federal structure, may permit a constituent territorial unit
to secede from the State by following or going through established
procedures. The seceding territorial unit, if constitutionally and le-
gally no longer a part of the former State, may join and become a
part of another State, or declare independence to become a third State
if it meets the requirements for statehood. Here, the international law
principle of self-determination does not support the secession.
Rather, it is a matter of domestic law arising through the exercise of
a constitutional or statutory right to "self-determination" in the form
of secession.
2. Secession by Agreement
A valid decision by the central authorities, or an agreement be-
tween the constituent members, of an existing State in the process of
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dissolution may successfully dissolve their former bond. An agree-
ment between the central authorities of the existing State and a se-
ceding fraction may achieve a similar outcome. It is only after the
voluntary dissolution or contractual severance of this prior bond that
a former constituent member becomes derivatively entitled to self-
determination in the form of secession. Such a former member may
choose to associate with another existing State based on agreement,
or simply to declare independence.
Strictly speaking, however, this derivative entitlement to self-
determination in the form of secession does not arise from general
international law, but from the relevant parties' agreement. The only
relevance of international law is that the new entity declaring inde-
pendence must meet the necessary qualifications of a State.
3. The Ultimate Attitude or Compromise of the Parent State
Where secession is unsupported by the existing State's constitu-
tion and law, or by any valid administrative decision or agreement, it
is less likely to succeed. Nevertheless, it is still possible for the ex-
isting State to subsequently acknowledge or recognize, explicitly or
implicitly, the separation or independence of a former territorial unit.
Such subsequent express or implied recognition would equate to re-
nouncing the existing State's sovereignty and control over the se-
ceded territorial unit or homogeneous group, and its effect would
constitute an agreement between the relevant parties. Here, again, the
seceding party's success does not result from the international law
principle of self-determination, but from the existing State's com-
promise of recognition and renunciation.
It is not unusual for a parent State that initially resisted secession,
to recognize the separation of a seceding entity that used to be its ter-
ritorial part. This may occur either because of the parent State's un-
willingness to retain the seceding entity at the expense of losing
other important interests, or due to its physical inability to keep the
country whole.
Such was the case of Pakistan and Colombia, for example. Paki-
stan eventually, albeit reluctantly, recognized the independence of
Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan)9', as Colombia did Panama.92
191. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, at 144, n.6.
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Both Pakistan and Colombia strongly opposed the independence of
their respective seceding territories, but gave up or withdrew their
opposition as an ultimate compromise. Indeed, neither Pakistan nor
Colombia was able to prevent its former territorial parts from seced-
ing. Their compromised recognition provided a legal basis, at least in
form, for the independence of Bangladesh and Panama, regardless of
how illegal, how immoral and how unjust the initial schemes of sepa-
rating Bangladesh from Pakistan and Panama from Colombia might
have been. However, the independence of neither Bangladesh nor
Panama could be said to be the result of the exercise of the right to
self-determination in the form of secession, for such a right was not
available to them in their respective course.
4. Unilateral Secession Opposed by the Parent State
The right to self-determination is distinguishable from unilateral
secession from existing non-colonial nation-States. Except for in the
context of self-determination, unilateral secession from an existing
State is not in itself a right that is recognized by and enforceable un-
der international law. In other words, the right to unilateral secession
is available under international law only to those "peoples" who are
recognized the right to self-determination in the form of secession.
While the self of self-determination and "peoples" are left unde-
fined, there is basis for the belief that not all peoples, sub-groups and
communities are entitled to self-determination, particularly where the
self-determination takes the form of secession. The principle of self-
determination mainly, if not solely, applies in colonial and quasi-
colonial contexts. "Peoples" who are recognized the right to self-
determination mainly consist of peoples of colonial territories, trust
territories, which were also colonies, and other non-self-governing
territories whose political status or attributes prior to self-
determination may be uncertain, but whose identity may be clearly
distinct from the parent, administering, or governing State.
In particular, the principle of self-determination does not endorse a
right to unilateral secession from an existing nation-State. Absent a
colonial or quasi-colonial element, where a territorial unit or an eth-
nic or cultural group within an existing State seeks to secede in order
192. See id., n.7.
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to become an independent nation, whether it can do so successfully is
not so much a matter of international law, but essentially a matter of
domestic law of the parent State and a matter of agreement between
the parent State and the secessionists. It may thus be argued that
where the existing State is firm in opposing any secessionist attempt,
a unilateral declaration of independence by a territorial unit or ho-
mogeneous group of such State would not have any legal effect un-
der international law.
The degree of the existing State's opposition to secession, the de-
gree of its determination to keep the country intact, the political will
of the entire population, and its physical ability, including its military
capabilities, to protect its territorial integrity and political independ-
ence, are all determinant factors for determining whether a seces-
sionist fraction can lawfully and successfully establish itself as an in-
dependent nation. When judging whether the fraction meets the most
important criterion for statehood, for example, its capacity to inde-
pendently enter into relations with other nations at the international
level, we must look to these factors.
Hannum rightly observes that "no state, no foreign ministry, and
very few disinterested writers or scholars suggest that every people
has the right to a state, and they implicitly or explicitly reject a right
to secession" and that "[t]here simply is no right of secession under
international law, nor has there been even preliminary agreement on
the criteria that might be used in the future to determine when seces-
sion should be supported. ' '  He further states that "self-
determination today does not mean either independence or seces-
sion.',
194
When discussing unilateral secession, Crawford opines:
From the perspective of different participants it might be seen either as an
expression of an inherent right to be free from oppression or as an act of
treason. But, however described by the participants, unilateral secession
did not involve the exercise of any right conferred by international law.
193. See Hurst Hannum, The Right of Self-Determination in the Twenty-First
Century, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 773, 776 (1998) [hereinafter Hannum, Sellf
Determination]; see also Hannum, The Specter of Secession, note 170, at 16 (stat-
ing that "policy makers should continue to reject the notion that there is a legal
right of secession").
194. See Hannum, Self-Determination, supra note 193, at 777.
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International law has always favoured the territorial integrity of states,
and correspondingly, the government of a state was entitled to oppose the
unilateral secession of part of the state by all lawful means. Third states
were expected to remain neutral during such a conflict, in the sense that
assistance to a secessionary group which had not succeeded in establish-
ing its independence could be treated as intervention in the internal affairs
of the state in question, or as a violation of neutrality....195
After carefully studying the international law and practice relating
to the right of self-determination, Crawford concludes that "there is
no recognition of a unilateral right to secede based on a majority vote
of the population of a sub-division or territory, whether or not that
population constitutes one or more "peoples" in the ordinary sense of
the word"; if it is possible to talk about self-determination for peo-
ples or groups within an existing State at all, such determination "is
achieved by participation in the political system of the state, on the
basis of respect for its territorial integrity.'
' 96
Two commentators recently write: "international law is today
quite clear that self-determination should only occur within currently
existing borders, except where otherwise agreed by sovereign states.
Additionally, it is supposed to be a right only for colonial territories
to gain their independence." 97
In fact, secession as an outcome is clearly in conflict with the
principle of territorial integrity, which has a clear prior place in the
norm. Both the Decolonization and 1970 Declarations establish self-
determination explicitly with the caveat that its exercise should not
disrupt territorial integrity. The 1960 Decolonization Declaration
states that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of
the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incom-
patible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations."'9" The 1970 International Law Principles Declaration also
195. See James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to
Unilateral Secessions (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca.
html>.
196. See id.
197. See Stephen Farry & Sean Neeson, Beyond the 'Band-Aid' Approach: An
Alliance Party Perspective upon the Belfast Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1221, 1231 (1999).
198. See Decolonization Declaration, supra note 176, para. 6.
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specifically subjects the principle of self-determination to the princi-
ple of sovereignty and territorial integrity by providing that:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independ-
ent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples.., and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total dis-
ruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or
199
country.
The Arbitration Commission of the E.C. Conference on Yugosla-
via, in its Opinion No. 2, observes that "it is well established that,
whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not
involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti
possidetis juris) except where the States concerned agree other-
wise."200 Although the Commission's statement is less than clear, it
seems to support the view of not using self-determination to disrupt
the territorial integrity and political unity of existing nation-States.
5. Minority Rights Versus Self-Determination
The right to self-determination is also distinguishable from the
rights of minority groups or sub-groups. Minority rights, which do
not include the right to secede but are, nevertheless, general and
broad in scope, are available to all ethnic, cultural, religious and
other identity minority groups within any type of nation-State. Self-
determination, on the other hand, includes the right to form an inde-
pendent nation, but is designed and recognized to govern only certain
special territorial situations concerning certain special categories of
rights of certain special "peoples," although the precise meaning of
such "peoples" is yet to be authoritatively determined.
199. See International Law Principles Declaration, supra note 181, at 124,
"Principle of Self-Determination," para. 7.
200. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 2, 31
I.L.M., 1497, para. 1 (1992).
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Relevant international instruments seem to distinguish "peoples"
from minority groups, when read in contexts and with reference to
each other. Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, for example, recognizes a right to self-determination
for "peoples," whereas Article 27 accords members of ethnic, relig-
ious or linguistic minorities only "the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practice their own religion, or to use their own language. 2 '
In his report to the United Nations, the former Rapporteur of the
UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities suggested that "[s]elf-determination is essentially a
right of peoples .... It is peoples as such which are entitled to the
right to self-determination. Under contemporary international law
minorities do not have this right.,
20 2
To ensure its continued existence and preserve its unique culture, a
minority group or sub-group within a nation-State does not need to
resort to the principle of self-determination. Misuse or abuse of self-
determination by minority groups often leads to undesirable and un-
necessary unilateral secession at the expense of the peace, security
and interests of the parent State, the seceding entity and perhaps
neighboring societies. Therefore, minority groups, in exercising their
minority rights, should refrain from resorting to self-determination,
particularly self-determination in the form of unilateral secession.
More importantly, rights of minorities under international law do
not necessarily include or intermingle with the right to self-
determination. This is particularly so where the minorities in ques-
tion do not qualify as "peoples" eligible to use self-determination to
separate themselves from the colonial powers or other remote and
alien governing States.
In general, where the government or other groups of an existing
State aggrieve an ethnic, cultural, religious or other minority group,
the remedy is not resort to self-determination, especially not to seek
independence. There are ways for such a group or sub-group to dem-
201. See Civil Rights Covenant, supra note 188, arts. I & 27.
202. See Hector Espiell, The Right to Self-determination: Implementation of
United Nations Resolutions, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1, at 9, para. 56
(1980).
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onstrate its identity and uniqueness and to seek redress. The rules of
international law relating to the rights of minorities already protect
these groups' ability to do so. In essence, such general minority
rights are independent of, and should not be confused with, the prin-
ciple of self-determination.
6. Detriments of Unqualified Self-Determination
The Commission of Jurists of the League of Nations stated in
1921:
To concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fraction
of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which
they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure. would be to
destroy order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in in-
ternational life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very
idea of the State as a territorial and political unity.
Despite the passage of time, the foregoing statement still holds
true. Truly, more and more ethnically, culturally, linguistically or re-
ligiously homogeneous identity groups are invoking self-
determination as a justification for seeking to secede from their par-
ent State. This trend obviously poses a threat to the sovereignty of
the nation-State, the very foundation of the international legal sys-
tem.
The threat posed by the unqualified exercise of self-determination
was identified by the U.S. representative to the United Nations long
ago in 1959: "self-determination[, if] carried to a logical but absurd
extreme, would in fact threaten the very existence of most of the
States members of the United Nations."''  While we have not quite
reached that point, we are proceeding steadily down a dangerous
path. More recently, an American politician thoughtfully observed
that the concept of "self-determination is neither a clear legal princi-
ple nor an overriding moral claim" and that it "has often led to dis-
203. See Report of the Commission of Rapporteurs Presented to the League of
Nations Council, League of Nations Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921).
204. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF- DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 317 (1995)
(quoting Watson W. Wise, The Right of Peoples and Nations to SelJ-
Determination, 40 DEP'T ST. BULL., 2 Feb. 1959, at 173).
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The international community should discourage secessionist
movements within the borders of existing States. Such movements,
whether or not under the disguise of self-determination, undermine
the sovereignty of existing nation-states. As a territorial unit or iden-
tity group within a nation is not entitled to self-determination, its
unilateral declaration of independence should be withheld recogni-
tion by the international community unless and until the parent State
so recognizes. In the event, for example , that the Quebecois declare
an independent Quebec or the northern Italians declare an independ-
ent Padania, other nations should refrain from granting recognition
until and unless Canada and Italy indicate their express or implied
recognition of such regimes. In addition to these examples, there are
numerous other territorial units or identity groups within existing na-
tion-States that seek to secede from their respective parent State and
form a separate independent nation, in which case the international
community should similarly refrain from recognizing or otherwise
encouraging secessions until the parent State no longer objects.
Fortunately, the international community of nation-States in gen-
eral has been antagonistic, or at least not affectionate, to independ-
ence movements because such movements threaten their very exis-
tence. To endorse one secessionist group would encourage more
others to pursue the same goal. As Judge Cassese stated:
"[to] concede to minorities.., the right of withdrawing from the commu-
nity to which they belong, because it is their wish.., would be to destroy
order and stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international
life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the
State as a territorial and political unity.',
206
D. THE UNAVAILABILITY OF SELF-DETERMINATION TO TAIWAN
Finally, the option of self-determination is not available to Tai-
wan. The territory of Taiwan is not an appropriate object for self-
determination. Furthermore, the population in Taiwan does not qual-
ify as a "people" or "peoples" or as holders of the right of self-
205. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., A Taiwan Deal, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at C7.
206. See CASSESE, supra note 204, at 317.
1158 15:1101
THE ISSUE OF TAIW1AN
determination within the meaning of relevant international instru-
ments referred to earlier.
The territory of Taiwan is not a colony of China, a trust territory,
nor is it any other type of non-self-governing territory within the
meaning of the UN Charter. Rather, it is an integral territorial part
and administrative unit of the State of China represented by the Gov-
ernment of the People's Republic of China. Geographically speaking,
Taiwan is not separate and remote from the Chinese mainland. It is
not a territory whose ownership is yet to be determined. Instead,
Taiwan is an integral territorial part of China. Although China owns
it, it did not acquire such ownership through colonization, mandate,
or trusteeship but through long time discovery, occupation, and pre-
scription. As such, the territory of Taiwan is not disposable through
the operation of self-determination absent the consent of the title-
holder. °7
The Taiwanese people are essentially ethnic han Chinese, sharing
the same origin, tradition, culture, language and to some extent the
same religions as the mainlanders. They are like the permanent
population of any other province or political subdivision in the
mainland. As such, they do not constitute a distinct people from the
rest of the Chinese population in order to be eligible to possess a
right to self-determination.
Neither does international law recognize Taiwan's right to seces-
sion, nor does Chinese law provide for unilateral secession. The Chi-
nese central Government, the sole legitimate government represent-
ing the State of China, is firmly against the independence of Taiwan.
It has never and will never enter into an agreement with the seces-
sionists permitting Taiwan to secede from the mainland. Should
Taiwan ever declare formal independence, the Chinese Government
will never recognize the validity of such a move, but may instead do
everything it can to keep the country intact.
At the recent discussion on "Rethinking the Cross-Strait Relation-
ship" convened by the Council on Foreign Relations, a colleague
from the Chinese mainland made a very good point. The Chinese
people and Government on the mainland respect the rights and inter-
207. See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text (discussing the element of
"territory" in the context of Taiwan).
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ests of their brothers and sisters in Taiwan. They respect the freedom
of choice of the Taiwanese people. However, just as one cannot
choose his or her family trees, parents, blood and gender, the people
of Taiwan cannot choose their history and identity. They cannot
choose their ethnic and cultural ties. They cannot opt out their "poor
relatives" on the mainland. They cannot opt out of relevant interna-
tional legal instruments providing for China's recovery of Taiwan,
and cannot choose to deny the fact that the predecessor of the Chi-
nese Government indeed resumed China's dejure and de facto sov-
ereignty over Taiwan upon Japan's surrender.0 8 In sum, while the
people of Taiwan have a broad range of rights to choose their politi-
cal system and participate in or influence the political life in the lo-
cality, there simply does not exist any legal basis, nor any practical
possibility, for Taiwan to attain independence through the so-called
self-determination or unilateral secession.
CONCLUSION
Before concluding, a brief summary of the main points follows.
First, there is only one China; Taiwan is an integral territorial part of
China; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole
legitimate government of the State of China. Second, the issue of
Taiwan is an internal matter for the Chinese people on both sides of
the Taiwan Strait and no external interference is acceptable or per-
missible. Third, the PRC's continuity of the imperial and republican
China, and China's sovereignty over Taiwan, are well supported by
historical facts, legally binding international instruments, and general
international law. Fourth, Taiwan does not meet the real criteria for
statehood. It in particular lacks sovereignty over a territory of its
own, and does not have a government capable of independently en-
tering into relations with other nations. The argument that Taiwan or
the "ROC in Taiwan" is already a sovereign and independent nation
208. The three-day discussion on "Rethinking the Cross-Strait Relationship"
was convened by the Council on Foreign Relations, with the support of the U.S.
Institute of Peace the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, at the Pocantico Conference
Center, New York, Feb. 10-13 2000. About 31 participants from the United States
as well as from China's mainland and Taiwan, including the present author, took
part in the discussion. The consensus of the conference prohibits the disclosure of
the identity of any participant concerning any oral presentation or remark made at
the conference.
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since 1912 fails. Finally, Taiwan as a territorial part and political unit
of China is not entitled to self-determination. It in particular does not
possess the right to secede unilaterally from China. Any attempt to
declare independence for Taiwan, whether through local plebiscite or
otherwise, would have no legal validity under Chinese law and inter-
national law.
It is beyond doubt that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the teri-
tory of China and that China's sovereignty over Taiwan is firmly es-
tablished both in fact and in law. The issue of Taiwan is completely
an internal matter of China, the resolution of which is up to the entire
Chinese people, including those in Taiwan. The authorities in Tai-
wan, until recently, also upheld the "one China" principle, although
they maintained that they represented China as a whole, a claim that
was false both in fact and in law. The change of policy on the side of
the Taiwan authorities, particularly Mr. Lee's theory of "state-to-
state relations" or "special state-to-state relations," will not change
the attributes and status of Taiwan as an inseparable part of the Chi-
nese territory, nor will a unilateral declaration of independence.
Any attempt at linking the concept of self-determination or unilat-
eral secession with Taiwan in order to support its independence
would amount to an abuse of the principle of self-determination and
an interference with the internal matters of China. Due to the inappli-
cability of the extreme form of self-determination to Taiwan, neither
the Taiwanese authorities nor the inhabitants in Taiwan have the
right to unilaterally secede Taiwan from China absent a constitu-
tional structure and/or the consent on the part of the Chinese Gov-
ernment and its 1.3 billion people permitting such secession
History and common sense tell us that we need to be practical and
realistic, and refrain from attempting to accomplish the impossible.
Independence for Taiwan is a dead-end. It is not only a legal impos-
sibility, but also an actual impracticability, because the PRC Gov-
ernment will not allow that to happen or succeed. I sincerely hope
that leaders and politicians on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will re-
frain from making irresponsible and risky statements and taking irre-
sponsible and risky actions detrimental to the cause of China's inter-
nal reunification, get down to the business of dialogues and
negotiations, and eventually find mutually acceptable, peaceful, and
political solutions to the Taiwan issue.
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